ID

196168

Etiquetas

PGOV, PINS, PREL, PTER, KJUS, SP, KCRM

Fecha

2009-03-10 18:44:00

RefID

09MADRID261

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

SECRET

Destino

05MADRID3260

06MADRID3042

07MADRID1914

08MADRID1214

08MADRID1269

08MADRID73

Encabezado

VZCZCXRO5523

PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV

DE RUEHMD #0261/01 0691844

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 101844Z MAR 09

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0362

INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0336

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0169

RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 6126

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2434

RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 3888

RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 0020

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RHEFHTA/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

Contenido

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MADRID 000261

SIPDIS

PASS TO ELIZABETH FARR OF NSC,

MARC NORMAN OF S/CT

ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE,

AND JANICE BELL OF INR

FOR MOLLY PHEE IN EMBASSY ROME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2024

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, PTER, KJUS, SP, KCRM

SUBJECT: SPAIN REFLECTS ON JIHADIST THREAT FIVE YEARS AFTER

MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS

REF: A. 06 MADRID 3042

B. 08 MADRID 1269

C. 08 MADRID 1214

D. 05 MADRID 3260

E. 08 MADRID 73

F. 07 MADRID 1914

MADRID 00000261 001.2 OF 006

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b),

(c) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. On the eve of the fifth anniversary of the

March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings (known in Spain as

11-M), Embassy personnel consulted a range of GOS officials -

from the Ministries of Interior and Justice - as well as CT

experts from academia and journalism on the extent of the

current threat that Spain faces from jihadists. POLOFF,

LEGAT and the CG in Barcelona also engaged Embassy contacts

on whether the GOS has struck the right balance between

disrupting cells on scant evidence to prevent an immediate

threat and risking that those detained in such investigations

could become further radicalized, more committed to illicit

activity, and perhaps even attacking Spain. While there is

agreement that Spain remains a jihadist target, there were

differing views on the prospects for another attack and on

how best to combat the jihadist threat. Sources also opined

on the prospects for building a strong case against alleged

jihadists in current and upcoming trials. END SUMMARY.

//Brief Reflections on the Madrid Train Bombings//

2. (S) Magistrate Javier Gomez Bermudez, the sentencing judge

in the 11-M case and in many other high-profile trials of

jihadists, spoke at length with POLOFF and LEGAT on February

24. POLOFF asked him - from all the materials that the

magistrate had read and heard, not just from the items that

were acceptable evidence in a court of law - whether there

was any indication of an Al Qaeda (AQ) link to 11-M. The

magistrate replied that there was no such link and that 11-M

was conducted by a bunch of like-minded criminals and

jihadists without a master plan or further connections.

Furthermore, he refuted suggestions that the 11-M attacks

were an act of revenge against the GOS by individuals who had

formed the second tier of a Madrid-based AQ cell - whose

leadership had been detained in 2001 - and later emerged to

conduct the Madrid train bombings. COMMENT: The Embassy

believes the cell responsible for the Madrid train bombings

exhibited considerable coordination in its attacks. The

Embassy highlights that, five years later, discussions of

11-M remain highly politically charged, and Gomez Bermudez's

comments appear to reflect one political view of the attacks.

END COMMENT.

//Agreement that Spain is a Jihadist Target//

3. (S) Gomez Bermudez says that - five years after 11-M - the

threat of a jihadist attack in Spain is even greater than it

was then. For one thing, Al Qaeda in the Lands of the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) now exists, which takes formal orders

from AQ Central in Afghanistan/Pakistan, which has given AQIM

the mandate to recover or "liberate" Al Andalus - the parts

of the Iberian peninsula that were ruled by Muslims for

hundreds of years during the Middle Ages - and Ceuta and

Melilla, Spain's two North African enclaves. An attack could

happen any day, Gomez Bermudez warned. Asked whether

jihadists' calls to liberate Ceuta and Melilla were issued

primarily for propaganda or recruiting purposes or if there

truly was an active desire to bring about an attack, the

magistrate responded that if the jihadists could execute an

attack in the enclaves, they would do so, but there is a very

MADRID 00000261 002.2 OF 006

heavy security presence that makes an attack unlikely, even

with all of the daily border crossings. He related an old

saying that for every three people you meet in Ceuta or

Melilla, one is military, the other is police, and the third

is a spy. (COMMENT: LEGAT suggests it is hard to believe

that, with all the daily cross-border traffic, jihadists

could not conduct an attack in the enclaves if they wanted to

do so badly enough. Furthermore, the Embassy's Office of

Regional Affairs (ORA) notes that Gomez Bermudez's statements

also ignore the possibility of enclave residents conducting

attacks. A cell in Ceuta that had planned attacks on an

explosives depot and on the city's fairground was dismantled

in December 2006. Among the detainees, ten held Spanish

citizenship while only one was Moroccan. See REFTEL A. END

COMMENT.) Gomez Bermudez told Embassy officials that he

believes the Casablanca attack of 2003 took place in Morocco

because the jihadists could not execute an attack in Ceuta or

Melilla. More commonly, he acknowledges, Spain is used as a

logistics base from which to finance jihadist activity.

4. (S) This claim is borne out by recent research by @ELIMINADO@, a foundation

devoted to counter-terrorism (CT) research. Jordan's

findings note that 24 of the 30 jihadist cells dismantled by

Spanish security services since 11-M were involved in

logistical support. (COMMENT: The 30 operations are the 28

that are cited in Jordan's publicly available research, plus

two recent cases in 2009: Operations Cheapest and Fish,

which dismantled cells in January and February, respectively.

ORA, however, notes that the ties of the Op Fish suspects to

terrorism were considerably exaggerated. END COMMENT.) In a

February 27 conversation with POLOFF, Jordan acknowledged

that, since 11-M, the number of Islamic militants in Spain

has increased, as has the number of different jihadist groups

operating in Spain. He also asserted that jihadists'

hostility toward Spain has increased and that the number of

attempted attacks on Spanish soil -- seven, by Jordan's

account - has increased. However, the professionalism and

the capabilities of these jihadists has not improved. At the

same time, there is more pressure on these jihadists by the

Spanish security services, which after 11-M have made

considerable efforts to enforce "preventative justice" - to

detain Islamic radicals before they become operational.

Because of this, the actual threat of another attack could be

lower than it was at the time of 11-M. He assessed that,

overall, the security services have the upper hand in the

situation, which is due in part to a greater recognition by

the GOS of the radical Islamist threat and the possibility of

an attack on Spanish soil. Jordan adds that analyzing social

networks is "fundamental" to understanding who potential

jihadists are. There have been so many cases in which

friends and family of a radical Islamist are also involved in

radical Islam. Understanding social networks is useful for

learning where they get their resources and where and how

they recruit.

5. (C) Antonio Baquero, the leading CT investigative reporter

for Barcelona-based El Periodico, disputed the view that the

jihadist threat to Spain has increased. In a March 10

conversation with the CG in Barcelona, he asserted that Spain

is in no greater or lesser danger of an attack five years

after 11-M. "It is a continuous threat," he said.

Baquero said in Spain, terrorism continues to be used as a

"political tool, like Iraq was in the U.S." He also opined

that the GOS was not forward-leaning in warning the public on

the extent of the jihadist threat, but he acknowledged there

was not much clamoring for that kind of information from the

public.

MADRID 00000261 003.2 OF 006

6. (C) @ELIMINADO@ who also works at the Real Instituto

Elcano's Global Terrorist Program, asserted to POLOFF on

February 11 that the jihadist threat to Spain is still

present. There was a threat before 11-M and there continues

to be a threat now. All of the motivations and

justifications that the jihadists had against Spain are still

there. The cause of 11-M was not the Spanish participation

in the Iraq war, although - together with the presence of the

Spanish military in Afghanistan and Lebanon - it has

contributed to the radicalization of jihadists in Spain. The

jihadist threat to Spain still exists and the jihadists'

intent to harm Spain is still real, Alonso assessed. There

is still a lot of jihadist activity in Spain. The calls for

the liberation of Al Andalus and Ceuta and Melilla are still

there too, he highlighted.

//Differing Views on How Best to Counter The Jihadist Threat//

7. (C) POLOFF asked Gomez Bermudez about the merits and risks

of the GOS's policy of preventative justice (see REFTELS B

and C) and whether disrupting cells on scant evidence and

detaining suspects for a few years risks even further

radicalizing those detained. The magistrate said that the

GOS is doing enough to warn the public about the extent of

the threat that Spain faces from jihadists and added that

there is the risk that the security services are even doing

too much on the preventative side, which could make the

public jaded. The security services are detaining alleged

jihadists with "nothing" for evidence, he claimed. Even so,

Gomez Bermudez said he believes that the GOS has struck the

right balance, especially in the short term, because Spain

cannot allow another attack like 11-M to happen. He opines

that Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba is very

knowledgeable on CT matters and that the GOS has adopted the

right approach. Nevertheless, the judge reasoned, the GOS

will need to revise its approach in the next two to three

years as the short term becomes the medium term. Baquero

agreed that Spanish law enforcement officials have a pretty

good handle on CT operational issues, but he suggested that

they have a poor understanding of Islam or the familial,

cultural aspects that weave terrorists and non-terrorists

together. Baquero further noted that, for the moment at

least, the different Muslim groups - Pakistanis, Maghrebis,

sub-Saharan Africans - are not working together and they all

have their own agendas.

8. (S) Based on the few experiences that the GOS has had with

the issue (he cited Allekema Lamari, an Algerian jihadist

who, after being mistakenly released from a Spanish jail,

helped conduct the 11-M attacks), Gomez Bermudez has the

impression that a jihadist does not repent and cease to be a

jihadist after being released. He says that all jihadists

who are foreign citizens who are detained and then released

are immediately deported so they are not Spain's problem any

more. LEGAT asked Gomez Bermudez who is the decision-maker

that gives the order on whether or not to go ahead and detain

a cell of suspected jihadists: the Minister of Interior, the

security services -- the Spanish National Police (SNP), the

Civil Guard (GC) or the National Intelligence Center (CNI) --

or the investigative judge who is looking into a case? Gomez

Bermudez replied that he understood that it was the Minister

who made the decision, which makes it a political decision to

proceed with the detention of suspects. COMMENT: LEGAT

found this answer interesting in that GOS security services

frequently tell him that it is the judges who decide.

Meanwhile, ORA remarks that - based on its information - the

GOS infrequently deports foreign jihadists from the Middle

East or Pakistan upon their release from prison due to

MADRID 00000261 004.2 OF 006

concerns that their human rights may be violated in their

countries of origin. In recent years, the GOS has

successfully obtained commitments from North African

countries, particularly Morocco and Algeria, assuring that

the human rights of deportees will be respected. This has

paved the way for the GOS to deport citizens from these

countries; however, released jihadists from the Middle East

and Pakistan are allowed to remain in Spain. END COMMENT.

9. (C) Alonso acknowledges that the GOS policy of

preventative justice involves risks, but - even though there

is not a lot of solid proof in these cases - the policy is

justified on the idea that it takes very little time for a

cell to go operational. What is needed, Alonso argues, is

better cooperation between the judiciary and the police, a

notion with which Baquero concurs. Baquero further suggested

that that the GOS also needs better coordination and

cooperation within the security services. He said the

intelligence services and the Mossos d'Esquadra - the Catlan

regional police force - work pretty well with the GC, but the

SNP appears to be left out in the cold except for occasional

work with the Guardia Urbana. Baquero lamented that none of

them really share information, and as a consequence they all

often pay the same informants for the same information.

Meanwhile, Alonso also says what is required in cases of

jihadist terrorism is a change of mentality in terms of the

judicial process in which there would be "a reverse burden of

proof," in which the suspects are guilty until proven

innocent. The circumstances in which the suspects were

detained ought to be given greater consideration, Alonso

urged, and ought to be accepted in a court of law. For

example, if a person has no job, but fervently preaches jihad

and has $25,000 in cash, then that person ought to be assumed

to be involved in financing terrorism. He should not just be

able to say he found the money and be released. Likewise, if

a suspect without a criminal record is found at a jihadist

training camp in the Sahel, the person should not be able to

claim convincingly that he is a tourist who got lost.

10. (C) Gomez Bermudez says that politicians in the Spanish

parliament are working on finalizing two new types of crimes

related to radical Islam: financing terrorism and the use of

the Internet for terrorist purposes. During a November 2008

speech at a CT conference in Zaragoza, Spain, Gomez Bermudez

had publicly called for these activities to be codified as

their own specific crimes. He suggested that the

parliamentarians' work on this issue is nearly completed. He

also highlighted that the EU has been working on laws like

this and so now Spain must update its laws to be in

compliance with the EU.

//Current and Future Trials of Alleged Jihadists//

11. (C) Gomez Bermudez asserts that the October 2008 Supreme

Court ruling (See REFTELS B and C) will not make future

prosecutions more difficult. He noted that the Supreme Court

argued that actions rather than words are convictable

offenses, which he said effectively is not different from

what had always been the law. Anything more stringent would

be jailing someone for their thoughts and that has no place

in a democracy, he remarked. The magistrate said he does not

see the National Court doing anything different to prosecute

jihadist cases as a result of that Supreme Court ruling. On

the topic of current and future jihadist cases, Gomez

Bermudez agrees with the notion that there is a lot more

evidence (especially emails) in the trial of the 14 suspects

as part of Operation Tigris (See REFTEL D) than there was in

the Operation Nova case (see REFTEL C), in which he claimed

there was "nothing" in terms of evidence. The trial for Op

MADRID 00000261 005.2 OF 006

Tigris case began on February 23 but has temporarily been

suspended due to health concerns of one of the principal

suspects. Professor Jordan suggests that verdicts in the

Tigris case may be issued in May or June.

12. (S) Asked in mid January 2009 how morale is within the

SNP and GC due to the recent Supreme Court acquittals of

jihadists who had been convicted by lower courts (See REFTELS

B and C), Joaquin Collado, Advisor to Deputy Interior

Minister Antonio Camacho, rolled his eyes and said, "you can

imagine..." Collado said it is difficult for the security

forces because they think they are doing good work, only for

the Supreme Court to overturn lower court convictions of

jihadists on the basis of lack of evidence. Collado agreed

with the notion that the October decision by the Supreme

Court did not raise the bar for the future conviction of

alleged jihadists. He claimed that in the case of Operation

Nova, the allegations were "difficult to prove." Collado

indicated that he believes there is more substantial evidence

in the upcoming case of Operation Cantata (See REFTEL E),

citing for example, that although no explosives were found in

that case, the security forces did find timers and other

items, which indicated the plot had gone beyond the talking

phase and had proceeded to action. He predicted that the

protected witness in that case would provide compelling

testimony against the defendants. Noting that the suspects

in Operation Cantata were only arrested a year ago, Collado

suggested it is still too early for the trial in that case to

begin any time soon. COMMENT: ORA notes that Spanish law

enforcement agencies tend to lose interest in cases following

the detention of suspects and do not always provide

investigating judges with the support necessary to secure

convictions. This greatly reduces the prospects of a

successful prosecution for maximum penalty. END COMMENT.

//COMMENT//

13. (C) Although Spain is adopting a very low-key public

observation of 11-M, the GOS, five years on, maintains a very

active CT policy focused on disrupting the jihadist threat.

Between its experience in combating radical Islamists and its

efforts to neutralize the more-than-40-year-long violent

campaign for independence by the domestic terrorist group

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the GOS has extensive

knowledge in CT policy and operational tradecraft and is

applying its expertise fully. As the new U.S. Administration

takes shape, there are numerous avenues for engaging and

improving the bilateral CT relationship. Senior GOS CT

officials are extremely well-positioned to discuss the

substance of CT issues with USG officials. Post recommends

consideration of a series of senior-level visits in both

directions, beginning with a visit to Washington by Interior

Minister Rubalcaba. Post has an excellent relationship with

Rubalcaba, whom we consider one of the most impressive and

influential Ministers in Zapatero's Cabinet and who has been

known to make Zapatero alter or reverse course on CT policies

even after the President has publicly committed himself to

another position. An invitation for Rubalcaba to travel to

Washington - it would be his first trip there - in the coming

months for a robust itinerary of inter-agency meetings would

very likely pay huge dividends in terms of bilateral

cooperation and, in light of Spain's impending ascension to

the rotating EU Presidency during the first half of 2010,

could also set the stage for enhanced US-EU cooperation on CT

issues. Rubalcaba speaks some English.

14. (C) Spain's northeastern region of Catalonia, and its

capital of Barcelona in particular, have for years been a

hotbed of illicit activity, including from radical jihadists

MADRID 00000261 006.2 OF 006

who finance terror and those who hope to commit terrorist

attacks. Beyond terrorist networks, a confluence of

organized crime syndicates - with connections that virtually

span the globe - that deal in the contraband of narcotics,

human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and

document falsification continues to operate in this region,

as detailed in REFTEL F. Catalonia has been the site of 18

of the 30 CT operations cited in Paragraph 4 above and

Barcelona, in the words of La Vanguardia, the city's leading

daily, is "the principal focus for the development of

jihadist terrorism in Spain and in Europe." An emerging

trend in the past 15 months is the frequency with which

Islamic radicals from the Pakistani community in Catalonia

are detained by GOS security services, including in

Operations Cantata, Cheapest, and Fish, discussed above.

(COMMENT: There are an estimated one million Muslims in

Spain and roughly 40,000 - 70,000 Pakistanis. Some 25,000

Pakistanis, roughly 90 percent of whom are men - live in

greater Barcelona. Baquero believes Barcelona became a

hotbed of activity because that's where Muslims settled.

This is where they could find jobs and start a life. The

terrorists used the economic immigrants as cover and it

works. Most of the activity is outside Barcelona proper in

places like Hospitalet, Badalona, Reus, and as far south as

Tarragona. END COMMENT.) As another recent example, there

are allegations that a Pakistani, who was living in Barcelona

at the time, is connected to the November, 2008 coordinated

Mumbai attacks, which left 179 dead and more than 200

wounded. Javed Iqbal, now in custody in Pakistan, allegedly

provided communications and financial support on behalf of

the cell that conducted the attack.

15. (C) For its part, Post recognizes the multi-faceted

threat to U.S. interests from a range of illicit activity

emanating from Catalonia and has been making efforts to

increase the multi-agency USG presence at the

jointly-coordinated counterterrorism, anti-crime, and

intelligence center that has been established at the

Consulate General in Barcelona. As part of this expansion,

Post is pleased that POL/GSO and RSO slots have been approved

for Barcelona and we welcome on-going inter-agency interest

in contributing to the increased USG presence in Barcelona.

CHACON;"