ID

241284

Etiquetas

PGOV, PINS, PTER, KJUS, SP

Fecha

2009-12-22 16:38:00

RefID

09MADRID1207

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

08MADRID1214

08MADRID1269

08MADRID73

09MADRID1124

09MADRID505

Encabezado

VZCZCXRO3135

PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR

DE RUEHMD #1207/01 3561638

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 221638Z DEC 09

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1589

INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1551

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2537

RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 4274

RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

Contenido

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001207

SIPDIS

@ELIMINADO@

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, KJUS, SP

SUBJECT: SPAIN: AL-QAIDA TIES EMERGE IN TRIAL FOR PLOT

AGAINST BARCELONA SUBWAY

REF: A. 08 MADRID 73

B. MADRID 505

C. 08 MADRID 1214

D. 08 MADRID 1269

E. OSC EUP20091215950011

F. MADRID 1124

MADRID 00001207 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: CDA Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The National Court delivered a

stronger-than-expected verdict on December 14 when it

convicted all 11 defendants arrested in the "Operation

Cantata" case to between 8.5 - 14.5 years imprisonment for

membership in a terrorist organization. Authorities arrested

the cell members in January 2008 before they could finalize

their plot to attack the Barcelona metro system (Ref A) in

response to the Spanish military presence in Afghanistan.

One of the highlights of the trial was the surprise testimony

by the government's star witness, a member of the Barcelona

cell before he turned on his colleagues, that he has been a

member of Al-Qaida (AQ) since 2005. The trial was arguably

the most high-profile one against radical Islamic terrorists

in Spain since the 2007 trial of the Madrid train bombers.

The strength of the verdict, which a leading

counter-terrorism (CT) expert attributes to the presiding

judge, is surprising for two reasons: it contrasts with a

series of acquittals by the Spanish judiciary in recent

radical Islamic terrorism cases (Refs B and C) and there was

a widely held view that the evidence in this particular case

was weak. Press reports indicate the defendants, all of whom

proclaim their innocence, plan to appeal the ruling.

2. (C) Meanwhile, the convictions - and recently announced

plans by the Defense Minister to increase Spain's military

presence in Afghanistan by 50 percent - occur against the

backdrop of the November 29 kidnapping of three Spanish NGO

workers in Mauritania by Al-Qaida in the Mahgreb (AQIM),

which in its communique claiming responsibility has indicated

that it may seek a prisoner exchange. END SUMMARY.

//The Case//

3. (SBU) As a response to Spain's military presence in

Afghanistan, the cell allegedly was plotting to conduct an

underground attack in the Barcelona subway system, a target

which reportedly was chosen because it would be difficult for

first-responders to access. A spokesman for Tehrik e Taliban

Pakistan (TTP), a Pakistani terrorist group with links to AQ,

would then issue a series of demands, which, if not met,

would lead to a series of other attacks in France, Germany,

Portugal and the UK. The plot fell apart when a cell member

who arrived in Barcelona from Paris was informed that a phone

call he just made to his family would be his last because he

had been selected to be a suicide bomber. The cell member

got cold feet and made a private phone call that alerted

security forces, which immediately arrested the group.

4. (C) Cantata has become synonymous with the GOS's policy of

"preventative justice" (Refs C and D). On November 17,

midway through the trial, Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza,

spoke at closed-door CT conference co-sponsored by Embassy

Madrid, where he touted Cantata as an example of the

preventative justice policy's success in keeping Spanish

citizens safe. Nevertheless, Operation Cantata has been

controversial from the moment it was conducted due to the

scant explosives (18 grams, less than one ounce) found in the

group's possession, the conflicting statements from Spanish

and Catalan authorities regarding the cell's timeline for an

attack, and doubts about the cell's links to foreign

terrorist groups. As early as March 2008, Vicente

Gonzalez-Mota, the National Court prosecutor in the case,

told The New York Times that the evidence in the case was

weak and in October 2008 he privately predicted to POLOFF

that some of the defendants might be released after just

three years in prison. (See Ref D). On November 16, CT

expert @ELIMINADO@ privately told POLOFF that @ELIMINADO@ did not expect

MADRID 00001207 002.2 OF 003

a strong verdict because @ELIMINADO@ did not think the evidence in the

case was strong. @ELIMINADO@' remarks likely represented the

consensus view among both CT watchers and the general public

as the case went to trial.

//The Trial//

5. (SBU) The trial was held during November 12 - 24.

Gonzalez-Mota originally asked for jail sentences ranging

from 9 - 18 years for the defendants (10 of Pakistani origin

and one born in India), whom he charged with membership or

leadership in a terrorist organization and - for two

individuals - possession of explosives. His strategy largely

hinged on the testimony of the cell member who got cold feet

who later agreed to serve as a government-protected witness

known as "F1" in court proceedings. The other key evidence

the prosecution used was the publicly available video in

which TTP claimed responsibility for the cell's activities,

jihadist propaganda material seized in the raid, and

bomb-making components, such as timers, batteries, cables,

latex gloves and steel pellets to serve as shrapnel.

Officials from Spain's Civil Guard (GC) and National

Intelligence Center also testified, asserting that the cell

was only at the stage of conducting tests for its attack.

6. (SBU) Prior to the trial, the indictment and all of the

public discussion about the cell's foreign links had focused

exclusively on TTP. It was therefore a surprise when F1

testified that he has been a member of Al-Qaida since 2005

and that he traveled from Paris to Barcelona under orders

from an AQ official in Paris. F1 testified that he spent a

year and a half undergoing training in AQ camps in Pakistan,

taking weapons training, the manufacturing of explosives, and

"brainwashing." F1 added that he has never faced charges for

his membership in AQ. In Paris, he reportedly formed part of

AQ's finance network. Given the chance to renounce his ties

to AQ during cross-examination, F1 reportedly did not do so,

replying cryptically, "I can only say that I have come to

tell the truth to the judges and they will be the ones who

decide who I am now."

7. (C) Gonzalez-Mota did not initially file charges for

plotting a terrorist attack, however late in the trial,

reportedly emboldened by the testimony of GC officials, he

decided to seek convictions against the defendants on these

charges. With the new charges added, the defendants faced

17-26 years in prison if convicted on all accounts. @ELIMINADO@ one of Spain's most

recognized CT experts, attended nearly all of the trial.

Asked if these new charges were a last-minute surprise,

@ELIMINADO@ replied that, on the contrary, the new charges were

the "logical conclusion" to the cumulative testimony and

evidence presented throughout the trial.

//The Verdict//

8. (SBU) The National Court on December 14 convicted all 11

defendants for membership in a terrorist organization and two

of the defendants also were convicted for possession of

explosives (Ref E). Shahib Iqbal and Qadeer Malik received

14.5 years for membership in a terrorist group and possession

of explosives. Maroof Ahmed Mirza, an imam who served as

spiritual leader of the group, received 10.5 years for

leadership of a terrorist organization while the remaining

defendents received sentences of 8.5 years for membership in

a terrorist organization. The Court ruled that the

defendants decided to follow the teachings of then TTP leader

Baitullah Mehsud, whose group has ties to AQ, which led the

cell to contact TTP and to preprare to carry out an attack

with explosives against the metro system. The ruling added

that the "indiscriminate" nature of the cell's planned attack

and the large number of potential victims are evidence of the

group's terrorist character. In issuing the ruling, the

judges viewed the TTP videotaped claim of responsibility to

be legitimate because the number of operatives cited was

MADRID 00001207 003.2 OF 003

consistent with the number in the Cantata cell and because no

other attack is known to have been planned in Barcelona

during that time.

9. (SBU) The Court acquitted all of the defendants of the

charge of plotting to commit a terrorist attack, ruling that

although the cell had agreed in general to conduct an attack,

a specific plan had not yet been formed for the exact date

and location of the attack.

10. (C) @ELIMINADO@ spoke at length with POLOFF on the day the

verdict was announced. @ELIMINADO@ attributes the strength of the

verdict to the fact that Judge Javier Gomez Bermudez led the

three-judge panel that heard the case. @ELIMINADO@ suggested

that current CT legislation gives a lot of leeway to the

judges in how to determine if a crime has been committed. In

some instances, such as the trials in the Operations Nova and

Tigris cases (Refs B and C), the judges have been more

lenient in their rulings. However, @ELIMINADO@ asserted that

Gomez Bermudez - who presided over the trials for the Madrid

train bombings and the original Al-Qaida in Spain cell among

others - "gets it" in terms of the threat that radical

Islamic terrorism poses and is more inclined to assign

harsher penalties.

//Outlook and Implications//

11. (C) The verdict in this case was stronger than was

largely expected. It contrasts with a series of acquittals

by the Spanish judiciary in recent radical Islamic terrorism

cases, and there was a widely held view that the evidence in

this particular case was weak. The defendants, all of whom

proclaim their innocence, plan to appeal the ruling to the

Supreme Court, which has a history of overturning lower court

convictions in radical Islamist terrorism cases. The Supreme

Court's eventual verdict will be the real test of the

strength of this case. Meanwhile, Spain is in the process of

creating a range of new terrorism-related offenses which

should strengthen its ability to prosecute radical Islamic

terrorism in future cases and limit the margin of

interpretation that individual judges have. In fulfillment

of the Council of Europe's 2008 Agreement on the Prevention

of Terrorism, Spain's Council of Ministers in November

approved legislative reforms to criminalize such offenses as

inciting terrorism and recruiting, training, indoctrinating

and financing terrorism. The proposal still requires

parliamentary approval to become binding law.

12. (C) The verdict also occurs against the backdrop of

AQIM's kidnapping of three Spanish NGO workers in Mauritania.

(COMMENT: Spain's Ambassador to Mauritania is Alonso

Dezcallar, brother of the Spanish Ambassador to the U.S.).

AQIM, which in 2009 killed a British hostage when HMG did not

meet the group's demands, has hinted that it is interested in

a prisoner exchange to secure the release of its "brothers"

in Spanish jails. AQIM has posted a message stating, "Your

security and your citizens depend on the safety and security

of our citizens. We will do everything possible to save our

hostages who are being tortured in your jails." Spanish

press reports from prior to the Cantata verdict suggest there

are roughly 65 radical Islamic terrorists in Spanish jails,

the majority of whom are from Algeria (many of whom belonged

to a forerunner to AQIM), although there are also numerous

Moroccans and Tunisians.

13. (C) There is widespread speculation that AQIM could also

demand that the GOS, which in November reportedly facilitated

the largest-ever ransom to Somali pirates to free the crew of

a Spanish fishing vessel (Ref F), pay a sizable ransom and/or

withdraw Spanish forces from Afghanistan. Defense Minister

Chacon's December 17 announcement that the GOS will seek to

raise its ISAF troop levels from roughly 1,000 to more than

1,500 signals that the GOS is not considering a drawdown in

its troop levels in Afghanistan. @ELIMINADO@ privately predicts

a long, drawn-out kidnapping in which AQIM uses the hostages

for maximum propaganda and economic gain.

CHACON;"