ID

40665

Etiquetas

PTER, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism

Fecha

2005-09-15 10:18:00

RefID

05MADRID3260

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

SECRET

Destino

04MADRID1142

05COPENHAGEN1220

05MADRID1349

05MADRID1809

05MADRID2082

05MADRID2223

05MADRID2537

05MADRID645

05STATE144222

Encabezado

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

Contenido

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MADRID 003260

SIPDIS

@ELIMINADO@

DS/IP/EUR

DS/ICI/PII

DS/DSS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: SPAIN: AN ACTIVE FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

REF: A. A) STATE 144222

B. B) COPENHAGEN 1220

C. C) MADRID 1349

D. D) MADRID 2223

E. E) MADRID 1809

F. F) MADRID 2082

G. G) MADRID 2537

H. H) MADRID 0645

I. I) 2004 MADRID 1142

Classified By: Polcouns Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) and (D).

1. (C) Summary. Spain is both a significant target of

Islamic terrorist groups and a major logistical hub for

Islamic extremist groups operating across the globe. The

March 11, 2004 train bombings made Madrid the site of the

worst terrorist attack in the history of the EU and triggered

the second major crackdown in three years against Spain-based

Islamic terrorist groups. Historically, Spain-based

extremists have tended to be older (30-40 years),

first-generation immigrants with a history of militant

activity in their home countries. The first Islamists did

not establish themselves in Spain until the late 1980s and

early 1990s, coming mainly from Syria and Algeria. The

influx of large numbers of North African immigrants is

changing the profile of Spain-based Islamic extremists,

creating a large pool of young, alienated men available for

recruitment.

2. (C) Extremist groups active in Spain tend to be

decentralized, collaborating on an ad hoc basis and united

more by friendships, family ties, and loyalty to the global

jihadist cause than by membership in any given terrorist

organization. While Spain-based groups at first focused on

organizing themselves and providing logistical support to

extremists in other countries, they became increasingly

aggressive after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent

GOS crackdown on Islamist terrorist cells in Spain. Spain's

withdrawal of troops from Iraq does not appear to have

reduced the desire of extremists to strike at Spanish targets

and Spanish authorities, long focused on Basque terrorism,

have shifted gears to deal with the growing threat posed by

Islamic extremists. Police have disrupted multiple terrorist

networks over the last year, including a group that funneled

suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq, and are currently holding

approximately 130 suspects in connection with Islamic

terrorist activities. In July, the GOS concluded a four-year

investigation and trial of 24 members of a local al-Qa'ida

cell; the Court is expected to render a decision September

20. There are at least 300 suspected Islamist terrorists or

logistical operatives in Spain and the Ministry of Interior's

senior terrorism adviser believes there may be as many as

1,000. Spain-based terrorists are believed to target local

USG interests; for example, one of the Madrid train bombers

was spotted conducting surveillance of the Embassy building

one year prior to the train attacks. The rapid growth of the

Moroccan immigrant community, combined with worrisome trends

among Spain-based extremist groups, suggest that Spain is

likely to remain an active front in the war on terror for

many years to come. End Summary.

//THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN SPAIN//

3. (C) There are an estimated 600,000-800,000 Muslims in

Spain, and possibly up to one million, the majority of them

recent immigrants from Morocco. The recent upsurge in

illegal immigration makes a more accurate figure difficult to

establish. Not surprisingly, the growth of Spain's Islamic

population has been especially robust in its North African

enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, where a GOS report forecast

that Muslims would become a majority within the next several

years (and warned that only 40 percent of residents

considered themselves "pro-Spanish.") Prior to the arrival

of large numbers of North African immigrants in the late

1990s, Spain's Muslim population was comprised of immigrants

from Pakistan and the Middle East, as well as a growing

number of Spanish-born converts to Islam. Spanish converts,

numbering some 20,000, tend to gather and to worship at their

own institutions. Converts are well represented in Spain's

leading Islamic institutions including the Islamic Commision

of Spain (CIE), which serves as the official interface

between the Islamic community and the Spanish government.

The CIE includes major organizations such as the Islamic

Federation of Spain and the Union of Islamic Communities in

Spain. Over 240 mosques and 64 religious communities are

officially registered with the CIE; approximately 160 mosques

in Spain do not belong to the CIE. Immigrants rights

organization "ATIME" is not a religious group, but most of

its members are Moroccan Muslims. ATIME recently angered CIE

leaders by proposing the creation of a new Islamic council to

incorporate the views of more recent arrivals in Spain and

establish controls to monitor against the teaching of

extremist ideologies by imams (implying that the CIE does not

adequately represent the views of the growing Moroccan

community or police its own members). Observers believe that

no more than 15 percent of Spanish Muslims regularly attend

religious services, though many likely attend services at

informal houses of worship, known as "oratorios."

4. (S) Until now, the broader Muslim community in Spain has

been of little importance to the activities of local

extremist groups. During the 1990s, the vast majority of

Spain-based Islamist radicals were recent immigrants with a

history of militant activity in their home countries. Very

few were second-generation immigrants or Spanish converts to

Islam. Islamic extremists coalesced in Spanish mosques and

continue to use them to distribute propaganda and scout for

new recruits, but they have had only limited success in using

mosques to tap into the broader Muslim community.

Authorities believe Islamist radicals prefer informal

religious instruction groups as a way to attract new members

and maintain group cohesion rather than working in mosques

where they are vulnerable to surveillance by police and other

mosque members.

5. (S) Spain's largest mosque is co-located with the Islamic

Cultural Center in Madrid and is popularly known as the "M-30

Mosque" because of its proximity to the M-30 highway, a

principal artery through Madrid. The M-30 Mosque is funded

by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Though the imams at the

M-30 Mosque are considered moderate by Spanish authorities,

suspected extremists are known to attend services there.

Prosecutors are investigating the former director of M-30

Mosque for his alleged role in transferring funds to a

suspicious NGO; the USG is assisting with this investigation.

Separately, three imams from the Catalan region were the key

figures in a network that facilitated the movement of

jihadists from Spain to Iraq to undertake terrorist acts

against Coalition and Iraqi Government targets. Their

mosques served as recruitment and indoctrination centers for

terrorist volunteers. This network was dismantled by police

in June, 2005. In addition to recruiting through mosques,

Islamist radicals distribute propaganda at Koranic schools,

halal butcher shops, and Islamic centers.

6. (C) Islamic extremists are not connected to any political

organization in Spain. There are no Islamist (or even

Islamic) political parties that could be used as a cover for

jihadist activities. This may begin to change as the

burgeoning population of North African immigrants, especially

Moroccans, begins to establish its own institutions in Spain.

There are no significant Spain-based Islamic extremist

publications, though many Spanish extremists have connections

to publications elsewhere in Europe, such as London.

//ISLAMIC TERRORISM - A RECENT ARRIVAL IN SPAIN//

7. (C) Though Spain was the site of several Islamic terrorist

attacks during the 1980s, including a 1985 bombing by Islamic

Jihad near Torrejon Air Base outside of Madrid that killed 18

and wounded 82, there are few indications of extremist groups

operating from Spain prior to the mid 1990s. The first

Islamic terrorist organizations were formed by Syrian members

of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled repression by the Asad

regime and settled in Spain in the late 1980s. Police

believe Palestinian radical Anwar Adnan Mohamed Salah, AKA

"Chej Salah," and Syrian al-Qa'ida member and propagandist

Mustafa Setmarian, AKA "Abu Mus'ab al-Suri," played a

critical role in organizing Syrian exiles in Spain to support

the international jihadist movement. In 1994, Setmarian

moved to London to work with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group

(GIA) publication "al-Ansar" and Salah went to Pakistan to

work with al-Qa'ida leader Abu Zubaydah in funneling recruits

to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. From 1995 until

his 2001 arrest, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas led the Syrian

group in Spain, during which period this cell expanded its

activities and aided the development of other Islamist

extremist groups. Yarkas and many of the other Syrian

extremists were relatively educated, prosperous, and

projected the appearance of being well established in Spain.

They reportedly raised terrorism funds by working with

Moroccan criminals engaged in fraud, robbery, and theft of

mobile phones.

8. (C) As Syrian extremists were becoming more organized to

lend support to international jihadist movements, Algerian

GIA members began arriving in Spain in significant numbers,

fleeing capture by the Algerian authorities. GIA members

settled in eastern Spain, mostly near Alicante and Valencia,

which have ferry connections to Algerian ports. Many GIA

members in Spain acted in a support capacity for GIA fighters

in Algeria, though some moved on to work for international

jihadist causes. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat

(GSPC), which eclipsed the GIA in Spain as elsewhere, was

detected by 2001 and in June of that year Spanish police

arrested GSPC member Mohamed Benshakria, who had fled Germany

to avoid arrest in connection with the "Meliani cell" that

had planned terrorist attacks in Strasbourg.

9. (C) South Asian extremists also arrived in Spain, with

most settling in the large Pakistani communities in

Barcelona, Bibao, Santander, and Logrono. Pakistani Islamist

radicals appear to play a mainly logistical role,

particularly in providing false documents and in transferring

funds. Spanish authorities are concerned that extremist

elements may have insinuated themselves into Pakistani

communities in the Catalan and La Rioja regions in order to

provide support and raise funds for militant

Pakistani/Kashmiri organizations such as Lashkar-i-Taiba,

Harakat-ul Mujahideen, Jaish-e Mohammad, Lashkar-e Jangvi,

and Jihad-e-Islami al-Alami. Recent reports indicate that

Dubai is a key financial hub for Spain-based Pakistani hawala

organizations, including those hawalas with links to crime

and/or terrorism. Police arrested 10 Pakistani nationals on

fraud charges in Barcelona in September 2004 and subsequently

discovered indications that the group had apparently funneled

money to senior al-Qa'ida figures in Pakistan and had made

suspicious videos of Barcelona landmarks. The group remains

in detention.

//MOROCCANS ARRIVE//

10. (C) The most important recent development in the local

Islamic extremist community has been the influx of Moroccan

radicals. They arrived in the 1990s along with tens of

thousands of Moroccan economic migrants, who have become by

far the largest Muslim immigrant community in Spain (500,000

Moroccans compared to approximately 40,000 Algerians, the

next-largest group). While some of the more important

Moroccan extremists matched their Syrian and Algerian

counterparts in terms of first-hand experience operating

against their government, many low-level supporters were only

recruited after their arrival in Spain. Moroccan extremists

tend to be less well off and most are involved in criminal

activity, such as drug trafficking (primarily hashish) and/or

fraud. Since the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the

Casablanca bombings in Morocco, the interventions in

Afghanistan and Iraq, and the dismantlement of the Barakat

Yarkas network, Moroccan extremists appear to have moved to

the forefront of the jihadist community in Spain, at least in

numerical terms. The large and growing Moroccan community

provides Islamic extremist recruiters in Spain with an ample

supply of poor, alienated young men and access to funds from

drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

//TERRORIST GROUPS ACTIVE IN SPAIN//

11. (S) The extremist community in Spain is decentralized,

with few national or institutional barriers and frequent ad

hoc collaboration among radicals from different

organizations. Few local organizations emphasize themselves

as a unit and organization names appear to be unimportant.

However, many extremists in Spain are affiliated to some

degree with organized jihadist groups in other countries. In

total, police believe there are at least 300 Islamic radicals

active in Spain and Ministry of Interior Senior Adviser on

Terrorism @ELIMINADO@ estimates there may be

as many as 1,000 such extremists. Islamic terrorist

organizations with a presence in Spain include:

-- al-Qa'ida: Barakat Yarkas and other members of the Syrian

group had direct links to al-Qa'ida. Barakat Yarkas is

charged with murder for allegedly organizing Mohamed Atta's

crucial meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh during Atta's final

preparations for the September 11 attacks. A decision is

expected in his case on September 20. Other extremist

organizations in Spain draw inspiration from al-Qa'ida, but

there is no clear indication that they act under instruction

from the leadership of the organization.

-- Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM): Police have drawn

connections between terrorists involved in the Madrid train

bombings and the GICM figures that carried out the 2003

Casablanca attacks, but it appears that the Madrid bombings

were organized and executed at the local level rather than

under instruction from the GICM leadership. Senior GICM

figure Hassan al-Haski was arrested in the Canary Islands in

December 2004 for his alleged role in the March 11 train

bombings.

-- Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC): According to

Spanish authorities, GSPC members in Spain appear to act with

a high degree of autonomy from their leadership in Algeria.

Many suspected GSPC members seem to be acting in support of

local and global jihadist causes rather than being dedicated

to the conflict in Algeria.

-- Armed Islamic Group (GIA): GIA was an important force

during the formative period of Islamist extremist groups in

Spain in the early 1990s, but no longer maintains a

significant presence in the country, since many GIA members

have been arrested, abandoned the GIA to join the GSPC, or

joined other local Islamist causes. March 11 train bombing

suspect Allekema Lamari served five years in a Spanish prison

on charges of being a GIA member.

-- Ansar-al-Islam: Ansar-al-Islam does not have a formal

presence in Spain, but a Spain-based organization affiliated

with the group was responsible for recruiting suicide bombers

to attack coalition forces in Iraq. Spanish authorities

dismantled the cell in June, 2005, jailing eight and holding

seven for deportation proceedings. Three of those detained

were imams at Barcelona-area mosques. The cell reportedly

succeeded in sending Mohamed Afalah, an extremist involved in

the Madrid train bombings, to Iraq where he may have carried

out a suicide attack against Iraqi government or Coalition

forces in May, 2005.

-- Salafiya Jihadiya: Formed in the early 1990s by Moroccan

veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, Salafiya

Jihadiya supported or inspired many Moroccan jihadists,

including several that worked with the organization in

Morocco and later moved to Spain.

-- Hizballah: Hizballah (which is not officially recognized

as a terrorist organization by EU countries but is monitored

by the Spanish security services) is believed to have a small

presence in Spain in a fund-raising and logistical capacity.

Spanish officials judge the risk of a Hizballah attack in

Spain to be very low.

//SHIFTING FACE OF EXTREMISM IN SPAIN//

12. (C) Nearly all known or suspected Islamic extremists in

Spain are first-generation immigrants, most of whom have a

history of religious fanaticism in their home countries or a

close personal connection to a Muslim extremist. They are

typically older than extremists in other countries, with the

majority aged 30-40 and very few below the age of 25. As

noted above, many of the first Islamists to take up

activities in Spain had a good education and many had good

jobs and were considered well integrated into Spanish

society. That remains true for many among the second wave of

Spain-based extremists, including Moroccans involved in the

March 11 attacks. However, among North Africans suspected of

involvement in terrorist activity there also many who are

poor or unemployed and many have criminal records for drug

trafficking, robbery, or fraud. The growing pool of

disaffected young North Africans is likely to become the

major recruiting pool for extremist organizers over the

coming years.

//IDEOLOGY ERASES ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES//

13. (C) Spain-based Islamist extremists are strongly

influenced by the "Takfir Wal Hijra" doctrine, which

justifies the use of illegal proceeds to fund jihadist

operations and accepts non-Muslim practices such as drinking

alcohol and drug trafficking as a cover for extremist

activities. Several of the Madrid train bombers reportedly

followed this doctrine, engaging in drug trafficking and

other criminal activity to finance the March 11, 2004

attacks. At an ideological level, the cells that carried out

the train bombings and other groups seem driven by general

support for the global jihadist cause and by their Salafist

religious beliefs rather than focused on a particular theater

of that struggle.

14. (C) Broad acceptance of these operational and

ideological doctrines among Spain-based extremists promotes a

high degree of cross-fertilization and ad hoc cooperation,

with most organizational, ethnic, and regional differences

subordinated to greater ideological objectives. Family

relationships and friendships are key to recruitment efforts.

Many senior extremist figures are also bound by shared

experience in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan or

elsewhere, or by shared association with highly-regarded

jihadist veterans. Organization names appear unimportant,

with shifting groups of Islamic extremist collaborators

adopting different names for different projects. For

example, members of Barakat Yarkas' Syrian network called

themselves the "Islamic Alliance" and then "Soldiers of

Allah," but never displayed much interest in a particular

name.

15. (S) The decentralization of Spanish Islamic extremists

was clearly seen in the network that carried out the Madrid

train bombings. The group included mainly Moroccans, but

also Algerians, Egyptians, Tunisians and other nationalities

from a variety of extremist organizations. Police believe

that at least three distinct groups came together to carry

out the attacks. One group, based in the Madrid district of

Lavapies, was led by Jamal Zougam, a Moroccan national

resident in Spain and an associate of jailed al-Qa'ida figure

Barakat Yarkas. A second group was directed by Moroccan

national Jamal Ahmidan (AKA "El Chino") from Madrid's

Villaverde district. The third group was led by Sarhane Ben

Abdelmajid Fakhet (AKA Sarhane "The Tunisian") and contained

members of various nationalities. Other actors included

Barakat Yarkas associate Amer Azizi, who remains at large and

is believed to have established the link between the Serhane

and Zougam cells. The various conspirators were brought

together by common associations with Islamic extremist

organizers, intermarriage among their families, and worship

at centers such as Madrid's Villaverde Mosque. The mix of

associations has slowed the progress of the investigation

into the train bombings. Despite having accumulated a mass

of information regarding planning for the bombings, police

remain unable to pinpoint precisely who led the attacks. It

appears likely that there was no single leader, but a

consortium of central actors who organized the plot and

sought specialized assistance as required (for example, for

manufacturing the bombs used in the attacks).

//DRUG TRAFFICKING - LOW-TECH TERRORIST FINANCING//

16. (S) The March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings were

financed with the proceeds from drug sales carried out by

Jamal Ahmidan (El Chino) and others. Investigators found

substantial quantities of drug money during searches of the

properties of March 11 plotters and ample evidence linking

low-level drug dealers to the cell that planned and executed

the train bombings. The subsequent arrest of a separate

extremist cell comprised primarily of Moroccans imprisoned on

drug charges, as well as the substantial criminal records of

North African immigrants detained in connection with yet

another network that sent suicide bombers to Iraq, suggest

that drug trafficking has become the primary financing

vehicle for Spain-based jihadists. This trend substantially

expands the pool of persons with possible involvement in

support of Islamic extremist activities and diminishes the

capacity of Spain's financial intelligence unit to use the

formal banking system to track the activities of suspected

jihadists. Mission elements are aware of this danger and

work with police to track drug arrests of North African

suspects. In just the period between April 1 and July 31 of

2005, Spanish police reported 246 arrests of Moroccan

nationals on drug charges, mostly hashish trafficking. Once

in the Spanish prison system, these detainees become a

priority target for Islamic extremist recruiters. With Spain

as the major portal for cocaine and hashish bound for the

Western European market, drug trafficking will likely remain

a lucrative source of funds (and recruits) over the long term

for terrorist groups operating in the country and/or

supporting jihadist causes overseas.

//THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN SPAIN//

17. (S) Spain-based Islamic terrorist groups target U.S.

interests in the country, at least for surveillance purposes.

The sizable extremist community and insular nature of large

segments of the Muslim immigrant population make it difficult

to monitor against such threats and/or detect them in the

planning stages, but specific threats have been identified in

recent years. Approximately one year before the 2004 Madrid

train bombings, the RSO Surveillance Detection Team

photographed an unidentified subject conducting surveillance

of the Embassy (REF I). During the course of the train

bombing investigation, RSO discovered that the subject

photographed by the detection team was Said Berraj, a key

planner of the train bombings who escaped the Spanish police

sweep and remains at large. Separately, RSO blocked an

attempt by Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alouny, who is on

trial for alleged membership in the Barakat Yarkas al-Qa'ida

cell, to enter the November 2004 Embassy election night party

at a Madrid hotel, ostensibly to cover the event as a

journalist. Alouny was out on bail at the time, but was

subsequently re-arrested by Spanish authorities. Mission

personnel believe that the U.S. Embassy likely is a prime

target for Spain-based Islamic terrorists.

//SPANISH RESPONSE TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISM//

18. (C) Despite Spain's long experience with radical Basque

terrorism and years of monitoring and disrupting Islamic

radical organizations, the March 11, 2004 Madrid train

attacks came as a shock to Spanish security officials. The

GOS has since tripled the number of officials charged with

tracking Islamic extremist activity and ramped up police

operations aimed at disrupting the operations of suspected

terrorist cells. Successes in 2004/2005 include:

-- "Operation NOVA," October 2004 - Police dismantled a

terrorist ring that was planning to purchase explosives in

order to attack Spain's High Court with a 500 kilogram bomb

(specifically to kill anti-terrorism magistrates) and to bomb

other Madrid landmarks. The group consisted mainly of

Moroccans recruited in Spanish prisons by Algerian national

Abderrahmane Tahiri (better known as "Mohamed Achraf").

-- Continuing arrests related to the Madrid train bombings,

such as the December 2004 detention of GICM figure Hassan el

Haski and the June 2005 detention of five Moroccan nationals

linked to train bombing conspirator Mohamed Afalah.

-- "Operation Tigris," June 2005 - The National Police

dismantled a jihadist facilitator network organized to funnel

suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq to undertake actions

against Coalition and Iraqi Government targets. Eight of the

39 suspects detained during the operation were remanded to

prison on terrorism charges, while seven others were

processed for deportation to their countries of origin.

-- Trial of 24 members of the Barakat Yarkas al-Qa'ida cell,

Spring 2005. A verdict is expected September 20. Spanish

media closely followed the three-month trial and GOS

officials have cited the importance of the prosecution of so

many suspected terrorists. Trial observers note that while

prosecutors provided ample evidence that several of the cell

members had participated in terrorist training activity, they

did not clearly establish a link between the Barakat Yarkas

cell and the 9/11 attacks, as alleged in the indictment.

19. (C) The GOS has worked closely with the USG in improving

its ability to identify, arrest, and prosecute suspected

Islamic extremists. Counterterrorism cooperation is one of

the cornerstones of the bilateral relationship. Attorney

@ELIMINADO@ and Justice Minister Aguilar announced the

formation of a Counter Terrorism Experts Working Group in

March 2005 comprised of USG and GOS security officials and

prosecutors. The group met in Madrid in May and will meet in

Washington in late October. Spain's highly-competent

financial intelligence unit, SEPLAC, works very well with the

USG at the bilateral and multilateral level.

//LINGERING PROBLEMS HINDER CT EFFORTS//

20. (S) There are several continuing problems that undermine

Spain's counterterrorism capabilities. The most troublesome

impediment is strong inter-service rivalry, which blocks the

free flow of information among the Civil Guard, the National

Police (SNP), and the National Center for Intelligence (CNI),

each of which plays a counterterrorism role. By all

accounts, a national counterterrorism center created in 2004

to improve coordination among the services has thus far

failed to achieve its purpose. As a result, there does not

appear to be a consolidated terrorist lookout list shared

among the services. A related problem is the lack of an

electronic namecheck system for customs/immigration officials

to help them identify out persons of interest. Separately,

recent press reports indicate internal frustration with the

head of the SNP's intelligence branch, Telesforo Rubio, whose

leadership style has allegedly led key figures in the SNP

counterterrorism unit to retire or transfer to other units.

21. (C) There are also structural differences between the

U.S. and Spanish legal systems that sometimes interfere with

information sharing, though both sides continue working to

minimize disruption to police investigations. In particular,

the central role of investigating magistrates, such as

Baltasar Garzon and Juan del Olmo, in the Spanish system and

the lack of protections for intelligence information have

complicated the USG's ability to share relevant information

with Spanish authorities. For their part, Spanish

magistrates have sometimes been loathe to share information

controlled under strict judicial secrecy rules.

//SPAIN FACING LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST ISLAMIC MILITANTS//

22. (C) The combination of an established and growing pool of

extremist sympathizers and Spain's continued identification

with "the West" on the part of those extremists makes it very

likely that Spain will be the target of future terrorist

attacks. The head of the MFA's Bureau of Analysis, Fidel

Sendagorta, expressed concern in a recent article that such

attacks would increase public rejection of North African

immigrants and stir nativist sentiment, which could in turn

alienate young Moroccan immigrants and make them easy targets

for terrorist recruiters. Sendagorta pointed to the problems

faced by the UK, France, and the Netherlands with Islamic

radicalism in their large Muslim immigrant communities as

forerunners of the problems Spain will face over the next ten

to twenty years. Unfortunately, it appears that Spain will

remain an active front in the War on Terror for some time to

come.

AGUIRRE;"