ID

145720

Etiquetas

PREL, PHUM, SP

Fecha

2008-03-13 16:50:00

RefID

08MADRID313

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

08KIGALI107

08MADRID201

08MADRID312

08MADRID7

Encabezado

VZCZCXRO4213

PP RUEHLA RUEHRN

DE RUEHMD #0313 0731650

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 131650Z MAR 08

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4481

INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1479

RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0031

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1037

RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0030

RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0120

RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0004

RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 3363

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0878

RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0005

RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0078

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0421

Contenido

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

@ELIMINADO@

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SP

SUBJECT: RWANDAN INDICTMENTS UPDATE

REF: A. SAMSON-CASEY E-MAIL 12 MARCH AND PREVIOUS

B. MADRID 201

C. KIGALI 107

D. MADRID 007

E. MADRID 312

Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Post urges extreme caution in allowing Rwandan

military personnel indicted by the Spanish judiciary to

travel to the U.S. for government-sponsored training. We

cannot predict how the Spanish judiciary or government may

respond should it become known that an individual wanted in

connection with the torture and murder of four Spanish

citizens is attending a U.S. military conference at USG

expense.

2. (C) Per ref. B, post has made inquiries regarding the

likelihood and timing of a Spanish request for Interpol red

notices for the 40 individuals indicted by Spanish judge

Fernando Andreu on February 6. An MFA contact said February

22 that he understood a request for Interpol red notices

would be forthcoming. However, these inquiries were solely

in the context of the possible impact on the Rwandan military

attache currently accredited in the United States and did not

contemplate active mil-mil cooperation with indicted

individuals. Of course, if there is a compelling reason for

allowing indicted Rwandan military personnel to the travel to

the U.S., we could try to explain that to the Spanish and ask

their forbearance.

3. (C) Post cannot evaluate the validity of the case and

defers to the analysis by Embassy Kigali (ref. C). Spanish

MFA contacts have said privately that this is an example of

Spanish judges using their judicial independence to pursue a

political agenda, similar to previous indictments of Augusto

Pinochet and Donald Rumsfeld. However, because specific

individuals are indicted in connection with the deaths of

Spanish citizens, we should expect that the Spanish

government will proceed diligently should the judiciary seek

an extradition. It is highly probable that such a

controversial subject would land in the media.

4. (C) LEGATT confirmed that a bilateral extradition could

take over a year to complete. However, the Spanish judiciary

could, if so inclined, process and deliver a provisional

arrest request in keeping with the U.S.-Spain MLAT in the

span of a day. While such a request might not compel an

arrest inside the U.S., the genie would be out of the bottle,

so to speak. USG failure to comply with such a request could

have serious public relations implications for the U.S. in

Spain, if not elsewhere.

5. (C) We have one other, very specific concern. Post is

currently placing maximum pressure on the GOS to approve the

U.S. extradition request for the notorious Syrian arms dealer

Monzer Al-Kassar (ref D,E). A dust-up with Spain over the

extradition of someone accused of genocide and complicity in

the deaths of Spanish citizens would only make it more

difficult for the Spanish government to approve Al-Kassar's

extradition.

AGUIRRE;"