ID

15292

Etiquetas

ETTC, EFIN, PTER, SP, Counterterrorism

Fecha

2004-03-24 11:49:00

RefID

04MADRID995

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

04MADRID960

04STATE37211

Encabezado

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

Contenido

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000995

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB, S/CT, EUR/ERA AND EUR/WE

@ELIMINADO@

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014

TAGS: ETTC, EFIN, PTER, SP, Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER FOR

SPAIN

REF: A) STATE 37211 B) MADRID 960

Classified By: Economic Counselor Judy Garber, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary. Spain has been a strong ally in the fight

against terrorism finance. That said, the GOS has not always

been as pro-active as we believe they could and should be in

this fight. While Spain passed bold new laws after September

11 providing the government with administrative authorities

to freeze suspected terrorist assets, we sense a reluctance

on the part of our contacts to utilize these new powers and

the regulations to implement those laws have stalled. The

horrific attacks of March 11 may well provide new impetus.

Whereas before, Spain looked to test these new authorities

against ETA rather than joining us in actions against

non-Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee targets, officials may now

feel less comfortable with such a narrow approach. We are

consulting closely with our working level contacts involved

in these issues as they prepare transition papers for the new

government. We believe terrorism finance is an area ripe for

continued strong bilateral cooperation. End Summary.

Strong Support With Lackluster Results

--------------------------------------

2. (C) Spain has been as strong ally of the United States in

the fight against terrorism finance. They worked closely

with the United States during their EU Presidency on UNSCR

1373. Spain agreed to chair with the United States the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Working Group on Terrorism

Finance. They have worked closely with the United States as

UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) Chair. At our urging,

they adopted new terrorism finance legislation providing the

government with unprecedented administrative authority to

freeze suspected terrorist financial assets. Spain has been

an important part of a core group of EU countries seeking to

reform the EU clearinghouse process to make it more

effective. They strongly supported our efforts to have the

EU designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and have been

working with other EU member states to extend the designation

of the PKK to KADEK/Kongra Gel. Last but not least, Spain

has been a prominent provider of counter-terrorism assistance

in Latin America, North Africa and elsewhere.

3. (C) Yet for all of that support, the results in Spain

have been marginal in measurable terms. While Spanish

authorities have moved rapidly to freeze accounts of those

individuals added to UN 1267 Sanctions Committee or EU lists,

little actual monies have been seized. Of those accounts

that have been frozen, the majority have been later unblocked

due to lack of clear identifiers leading to initial error in

the freezing action or upon petition of hardship. Action

taken by Spanish authorities through judicial rather than

administrative channels are very difficult to track as there

is no central registry of such freezing orders.

Areas for Improvement

---------------------

4. (C) While we do not believe that Spain has failed to

freeze any accounts of individuals on these lists, we believe

they have not used administrative authorities now at their

disposable to go after suspected terrorist assets. In

fairness, implementing regulations for the law passed in May

2003 have yet to be approved and relevant authorities

(members of the Terrorism Finance Oversight Committee) are

concerned about using their new powers without full legal

cover. Likewise, there is considerable reluctance by the

Ministry of Interior to notify for coordinated UN freezing

(or EU action) any suspected Islamic terrorist financiers

already in custody, much less those under suspicion.

Officials voice concern that without an actual prior

conviction of such individuals by a court of law, a judicial

appeal process could theoretically overturn administrative

actions to freeze assets. Our arguments that such

administrative actions are meant to be preventative and

pro-active in nature have fallen on deaf ears.

5. (C) We also suspect that oversight of Islamic charities in

Spain has not been as strong as it could be. We base this

conclusion on primarily anecdotal evidence. For example, one

Spanish businessman told us that in the process of due

diligence for a multimillion dollar investment in Cartegena,

he inquired whether there were security concerns arising from

the area's large immigrant population. The police reportedly

responded that they knew that many of the North African

immigrants in the area gave heavily to Islamic charities and

suspected that some of these funds were being siphoned off to

extremist causes but had no real proof. This tracks with

comments of our Ministry of Economy contacts who questioned

with us the conviction of senior level officials at the

Ministry of Interior (prior to March 11) that Islamic

terrorism in Spain was an area of legitimate concern. The

focus was clearly on ETA.

New Government, New Opportunities

---------------------------------

6. (C) Spanish President-elect Zapatero has stated clearly

that the fight against terrorism will be a priority for his

government. The terrorist attacks of March 11 virtually

leave him no choice. Our working level contacts on terrorism

finance are starting to prepare the briefing papers for the

incoming Zapatero government. We are consulting closely with

them, sharing thoughts on areas of emphasis -- ie, the

importance of Spain notifying UNSC of suspected Al-Qaeda

members for asset freezing purposes, reform of the EU

clearinghouse, eliminating distinctions in EU law between

domestic and international terrorism, etc. We will also try

to glean inklings of the likely views of incoming officials

(as they are named) who will be vital to keeping Spain front

and center on these issues.

7. (C) Our contacts believe Spain will continue to be active

on terrorism finance issues given the long-standing fight

against ETA terrorism and the need to apply lessons learned

from the investigation of the March 11 terrorist attacks.

Many think the new government will want to announce new

initiatives (real or recycled) in the fight against terrorism

quickly, including in the area of terrorism finance. We

understand Treasury has already reached out to its contacts

offering to support a conference on these issues should Spain

still be interested in hosting an event similar to January's

ill-fated terrorism finance conference. It is too soon to

know if such a conference would be favored by the new

government, but such offers will be important gestures to the

new government. Spain has a lot to offer on terrorism

finance -- and a lot more to do itself as evidence of its

role as an al-Qaeda logistical base becomes ever clearer. We

strongly believe terrorism finance should remain a key area

for continued bilateral cooperation.

ARGYROS;"