ID

22550

Etiquetas

PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP

Fecha

2004-11-05 16:29:00

RefID

04MADRID4283

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

04STATE223273

Encabezado

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

Contenido

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004283

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE, WHA/AND AND WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP

SUBJECT: SPAIN: ZAPATERO TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WITH

CHAVEZ

REF: STATE 223273

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick,

reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary

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1. (C) The Government of Spain is aware of all three human

rights issues raised in reftel demarche. The Spanish agree

that the possible moves by Chavez supporters threaten

democracy, human rights and civil rights in Venezuela. The

Zapatero government will raise these issues with Venezuelan

president Hugo Chavez's during his visit to Madrid November

22-23, a visit which Chavez insisted on making, according to

Spanish Foreign Ministry interlocutors. However, given

President Zapatero's desires to build dialog with Chavez, we

do not expect him to press Chavez hard on these questions.

End summary.

--------------------------------------------- ---

GOS To Raise Demarche Issues During Chavez Visit

--------------------------------------------- ---

2. (C) Poloff raised reftel issues November 4 with Ernesto

de Zulueta, the MFA's deputy director general for Andean

countries. With respect to the arrest warrants for the

SUMATE NGO, de Zulueta said he understands the process has

essentially been put on hold for the moment. De Zulueta said

further that the Spanish government plans to address this

matter, as well as the two disturbing proposed laws we raised

in the demarche, with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez when

he visits Madrid November 22-23. According to de Zulueta,

the GOS has discussed all three issues with its EU partners,

but in the end, Spain decided that direct talks between the

Zapatero and Chavez governments would be more useful than a

public declaration by the GOS or the EU. We emphasized the

urgency of these matters to Zulueta and urged the Spanish

government to raise them with the Venezuelan government

sooner, but de Zulueta argued the Chavez visit offered the

best opportunity to press the Venezuelans effectively.

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Chavez "Insisted" on Visit

--------------------------

3. (C) De Zulueta took pains to emphasize that the GOS

agreed to Chavez's visit only after lengthy, dogged

insistence on Chavez's part. "The impetus for the meeting

came from Chavez, not from the Government of Spain, I can

assure you," explained de Zulueta. (In late October, FM

Moratinos' chief of staff told us the same -- Chavez insisted

on coming to Madrid.) Chavez will be traveling with a group

of Venezuelan businessmen and women. De Zulueta did not yet

know who else would accompany Chavez or whether FM Perez

would join trip. The GOS's only goal for the visit will be

to begin some form of constructive dialog with Chavez,

something, claimed de Zulueta, that was not occurring under

the Aznar government due to the strained relationship between

the former Spanish president and Chavez. The Spanish

government has no other agenda for the meeting at this point,

according to de Zulueta.

4. (C) De Zulueta also asserted that the Spanish government

has no illusions about the likelihood of progress with Chavez

-- in fact, troubling developments in Venezuela such as the

three issues reftel demarche raised signal a weakening of

democracy and human rights in Venezuela. However, Zapatero

believes Spain must at least make an attempt to build some

sort of constructive relationship with Chavez because he won

the August referendum and "is the only game in town." The

opposition remains remarkably disorganized and ineffective,

de Zulueta noted.

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Comment

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5. (C) De Zulueta's explanation of why Spain needs to open

dialog with Chavez is nearly identical to Spain's reasons for

wanting to do the same with Castro, though the Venezuela

issue is much less contentious in Spain. Although de Zulueta

said Spain does not have high hopes for dialog with Chavez,

Zapatero clearly thinks he can build bridges where Aznar

could not or would not. Zapatero believes his efforts to

build a relationship with Chavez are consistent with his

self-image as a "man of dialog," a phrase he has uttered

repeatedly since the Socialists prevailed last March. We

expect Zapatero government to raise the issues outlined in

reftel demarche with Chavez during his visit in late

November, but not to press hard, because it is highly

unlikely Zapatero will risk turning Chavez off during the

Madrid visit.

ARGYROS;"