Cable en el que la embajada de EE UU intenta frenar despidos en Morón

  • La embajada de EE UU en Madrid advierte a Washington sobre las posibles represalias de ZP si se producen despidos.
  • El asesor político cree que el Gobierno socialista podría retirar el contingente en Afganistán.

ID

222676

Etiquetas

MARR, PREL, SP

Fecha

2009-08-28 06:04:00

RefID

09MADRID861

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

Encabezado

Contenido

VZCZCXYZ0000

RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #0861/01 2400604

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 280604Z AUG 09

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1144

INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC

RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RUFAPUV/NAVSTA ROTA SP

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1564

RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

RUEAHQA/HQUSAF WASHDC

RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000861

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019

TAGS: MARR, PREL, SP

SUBJECT: JOB CUTS AT MORON COULD HAVE SERIOUS NEGATIVE

CONSEQUENCES FOR RELATIONS WITH SPAIN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. William H. Duncan, Reasons 1.4(b

) and (d).

1. (C) Summary and action request: U.S. Air Forces in

Europe (USAFE) has set in motion a procurement process that

is likely to result in the discharge of 50-100 Spanish

workers at Moron air base in April 2010, followed by an

additional 20-100 job cuts in October 2011. At the same

time, we understand the U.S. Navy is facing budget cuts at

the base at Rota in FY-2011 that may result in local national

job losses there. This cable assesses the potential negative

consequences of these job losses. Post strongly recommends

consultations between the Departments of State and Defense

over the implications of these job cuts and the possibility

that they can be mitigated or avoided altogether. End

summary and action request.

2. (C) Moron is a Spanish air base located near Seville in

southern Spain. Along with the air and naval base at Rota

(near Cadiz), Moron has played a key role in a logistical

train that stretches from the U.S. to theaters of operation

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Governed by a bilateral agreement

on defense cooperation that dates to the Eisenhower

Administration (three decades before Spain joined NATO), our

defense arrangements with Spain are a cornerstone of the

bilateral relationship. Some 6,000 U.S. military flights

transit Spain each year and recent years have seen an annual

average of 150 port calls by U.S. warships.

3. (C) Post has for some time been engaged in consultations

with USAFE regarding cutbacks at Moron air base that will

result in the dismissal of a number of Spanish employees. We

appreciate USAFE's willingness to engage on this issue. The

job cuts are, as we understand it, driven by a combination of

operational, budgetary and contracting policy factors and

(after separation and potential litigation costs are paid)

will save around 4 million annually. We are not in a

position to second-guess USAFE on those matters. However, we

want to ensure that senior decision-makers at the Departments

of State and Defense understand the Spanish political context

and the potential negative consequences of the job cuts,

which we believe could be very serious and spill over into

other areas of the military-to-military and indeed overall

bilateral relationship. We also understand the U.S. Navy is

looking at serious budget cuts at Rota next year, raising the

possibility of multiple rounds of job losses at the bases.

4. (C) We saw last year a concrete example of how seriously

the GOS takes labor issues at the two bases. During annual

labor negotiations, the Spanish union made numerous demands

regarding wages and working conditions. DOD was able to

agree to all but two. No jobs were at stake, and the

outstanding requests bordered on the absurd (e.g., being paid

40 hours wages for a shorter work week). Nevertheless, the

Ambassador was called by Minister of Interior Rubalcaba and

asked to explain why DOD could not satisfy all the demands.

The Minister's inquiry started with President Zapatero. We

were able to offer a convincing explanation of our position

and quiet the President's concerns, but the incident was

revealing. On paper, Rubalcaba has no role whatsoever with

the respect to the bases or the workers. We surmise Zapatero

asked him to engage us on the issue (rather than his

Ministers of Defense or Labor) because of Rubalcaba's

formidable reputation as a political fireman (Zapatero

describes him as the "sharpest knife in the drawer"). If the

GOS was that concerned over relatively minor and excessive

union demands over working hours, what will the reaction be

to a large-scale job cuts?

5. (C) Also, last year when this issue rose to the cabinet,

Zapatero was the most popular politician in Spain and his

political fortunes were at their zenith. Since then, the

world financial crisis has hit Spain full force, and

Zapatero's popularity has crumbled. Unemployment has risen

from less than nine percent last year to over 18 percent

today. Analysts uniformly predict it will pass 20 percent

next year. Analysts also insist Spain will be one of the

last countries in Western Europe to struggle out of

recession. Zapatero and his party lost control of Galicia in

local elections in March 2009 and recently dropped behind the

main opposition party in the polls for the first time since

he won the presidency in 2004. Everyone here, including

government insiders, predicts a bitter political season this

fall as Zapatero struggles to get his annual budget passed

(he does not have a majority in congress) and the opposition

parties sense weakness. All of this comes down to one issue:

unemployment. Ordinary Spaniards are understandably

terrified by spiraling jobless rates, and Zapatero has to

stop the bleeding or risk seeing his second term go to ruin.

When U.S. Secretary of Transportation LaHood met with

Zapatero in May, the President sought the Secretary's

personal assistance in convincing General Motors to preserve

jobs at Spain's Opel plant.

6. (C) The two bases are located in Andalusia, Spain's most

populous autonomous community (i.e., state), and a stronghold

for Zapatero's party. Earlier this year when he tried to

shore up his image with a cabinet shuffle, Zapatero brought

the powerful President of Andalusia and Socialist Party

baron, Manuel Chavez, into his cabinet as Third Vice

President. No politician slipping in the polls can ignore

his base, and the core of Zapatero's base is Andalusia.

7. (C) The principal opposition party, the Partido Popular

(PP), is likely to make things worse for us by using the job

cuts to beat up Zapatero. President Obama is wildly popular

in Spain, and Zapatero has very publicly made a new and

closer relationship with the U.S. a centerpiece of his

foreign policy. The PP will be quick to use job cuts at the

bases to prove that Zapatero has failed in his attempts to

improve ties with the U.S. Conversely, parties farther to

the left will use the job cuts to argue that Spain's returns

on its defense arrangement with the U.S. (never popular with

the Spanish left) are ever-diminishing. Since any additional

Spanish effort in Afghanistan is always regarded here as

something Spain does for the U.S., we would expect many to

ask why additional Spanish troops should be put at risk when

the U.S. is putting Spanish workers in the unemployment line.

Some politicians and journalists will no doubt appeal to the

defining Spanish characteristic - pride - and insist Zapatero

somehow retaliate for the U.S. "insult."

8. (C) For all of these reasons, the job cuts at Moron (and

maybe Rota after that) could put Zapatero in an extremely

difficult position. Assuming he cannot reverse the decision

(and we expect the GOS would reach out to senior-levels of

the USG in an effort to do so), he may feel compelled to do a

number of things that will be unhelpful to the USG. First,

our agreement on defense cooperation frees us from paying a

number of local taxes and fees. Revenue-hungry bureaucrats

and politicians periodically take a run at these exemptions

(at the moment, they are targeting a one million dollar a

year tax break on utilities), but we have so far enjoyed the

support of the GOS in beating off these efforts. If we cut

the jobs, we may find the cost of operating in Spain will

suddenly increase, potentially eating up any payroll savings.

We should also never forget that our use of the bases

functions on the basis of good will and trust. If we give

the GOS a black eye over jobs, we anticipate the good will

which lubricates the day to day working of our military

presence will dissipate. This could affect routine

operations (e.g., blanket flight clearances) and the "special

requests" we make from time to time driven by unforeseeable

operational necessities. It also poisons the well for future

attempts to engage the Spanish military more closely on U.S.

priorities (e.g., Africom).

9. (C) One of the most dangerous aspects of this situation is

public relations. The two bases get very little media

attention (and almost all of that comes from allegations U.S.

military flights via Spain carried terrorism detainees to

Guantanamo). No news is good news in this case. The Spanish

public is pacifistic and suspicious of military activity,

especially U.S. military activity. Nevertheless, these two

bases are far from the media centers of Madrid and Barcelona.

Anything that spotlights the bases in the media is probably

going to hurt our interests. We can certainly anticipate the

unions will go to the press to claim they are being

mistreated by the U.S. military, casting our use of the bases

in a very negative light.

10. (C) Avoiding these job cuts altogether would be the

safest course. As we understand the situation that would

mean identifying requirements for Moron that would

necessitate keeping operational capabilities at the current

level. Obviously Embassy Madrid cannot do that, but we

strongly recommend DOD look seriously at this possibility.

It may be that there are activities conducted elsewhere that

could be moved to Moron or Rota, offsetting the job losses

anticipated under the current scenario. We also urge that

before jobs cuts are made at Moron, DOD review the situation

carefully and consider as well possible future cuts at Rota.

If this is done one base at a time and is driven exclusively

by contracting officers, we are likely to be forced to go

back to the Spanish repeatedly in a "death of a thousand

cuts" scenario. That will probably only increase the pain

for all concerned. We recently learned that a contract award

may occur as early as October 2009, and the available time

for interagency consultations on this issue appears to be

short. We therefore urge the Departments of State and

Defense to discuss these issues at the earliest opportunity.

DUNCAN;"

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