ID

79384

Etiquetas

PTER, KTFN, EFIN, KPAO, ASEC, SP

Fecha

2006-09-22 12:12:00

RefID

06MADRID2380

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

SECRET

Destino

06STATE145269

Encabezado

VZCZCXYZ0004

RR RUEHWEB

Contenido

DE RUEHMD #2380/01 2651212

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 221212Z SEP 06

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0814

S E C R E T MADRID 002380

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

@ELIMINADO@

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016

TAGS: PTER, KTFN, EFIN, KPAO, ASEC, SP

SUBJECT: DISRUPTING EXTERNAL FINANCING TO THE TALIBAN -

OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WITH SPAIN BEST

REF: STATE 145269

Classified By: DCM Hugo LLorens - Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Although an info addressee, per reftel invitation

Embassy offers the following comments. The initiative on

disrupting external financing to the Taliban could help

induce the GOS to reenergize the fight against Taliban

financing, among other reasons because Spain has some 600

soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. But, as a September 2 El

Pais article (also appeared in the September 5 English

language version of El Pais) made clear, there are doubts,

including among senior GOS officials, regarding the efficacy

of the fight against terrorism finance, especially

designations. See Septel for a summary of the article. We

remain confident that the GOS checks for funds based on the

prenotifications we deliver. And anecdotal evidence suggests

that the formal financial sector takes the terrorism finance

regulation/oversight role by the Bank of Spain and Ministry

of Economy seriously and considers the terrorism related

compliance regulations to be extensive. Our sense is that a

renewed focus on operational cooperation would provide the

greatest impetus in intensifying the fight against terrorism

finance in Spain. There is already a joint U.S.-Spain

Counterterrorism Working Group. While not a perfectly

functioning entity, perhaps this group could do more in the

terrorism finance prevention area. Embassy offers the

following suggestions with respect to reftel.

A) We should continue to expend energy on getting al-Qa'ida

financier Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas designated. This should

be relatively easy as he has already been convicted of

membership in a terrorist organization. The practical effect

of designating him may be limited as he is in jail, but it

would certainly have some symbolic value. We can certainly

continue to press on Barakat Yarkas cohort Driss Chebli. He

has been tried, but his conviction was overturned on appeal.

Although a conviction is not required for designation in

Spain, we suspect his release will continue to make the GOS

balk at designating him.

B) We should continue to press the GOS to adopt implementing

regulations for its 2003 terrorism law. Once implementing

regulations are adopted, the GOS would have preventative

freezing mechanisms. We understand that a turf battle

between the Ministry of Interior (which stands to gain

authorities) and the Bank of Spain (which stands to lose

authorities) is partly to blame for the continued

non-adoption of the implementing regulations. We also

understand that the regulations have gotten entangled with

jurisidictional battles between the central and regional

governments.

C) Consider intensifying terrorism finance cooperation in the

context of the U.S.-Spain Counterterrorism Working Group.

Information from the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC)

in Kabul could perhaps form the basis for investigations in

Spain - there are a number of hawalas with Pakistan links

(and therefore almost certainly with Afghanistan as well)

operating in Spain. Spanish authorities would probably be

willing to, upon request, intensify intelligence operations

against these entities. Interior Ministry Secretary of State

for Security, Antonio Camacho.

(a regular U.S. Embassy interlocutor) noted during his

intervention at the November 2005 U.S. Embassy-Ortega y

Gasset terrorism finance conference that dealing with hawalas

was big challenge for Spanish law enforcement.

D) Reftel says that the U.S. is working to establish an

information-sharing mechanism to be used against the Afghan

narcotics trade with U.K. and Russian counterpart agencies.

As a NATO ally, Spain has deployed 600 troops in Afghanistan

and is a major drug importer for transshipment and domestic

consumption purposes. We

believe we should consider cooperating in the same way with

Spain.

E) As part of the Treasury-led effort to bring the hawala

sector in Afghanistan under formal regulation, perhaps an

international workshop on this topic could be arranged.

Spanish authorities have the same issues with respect hawalas

operating in Spain.

F) Assuming Spanish participation would be welcome, Embassy

would be willing to encourage Spanish participation in the

envisioned December workshop on charities. The workshop may

want to bill itself as dealing with a broader range of

organizations than "charities". The Spaniards tell us that

there are few, if any, Islamic charities per- se operating in

Spain. There are, however, mosques that engage in charitable

activities. The press has reported that the Spanish National

Policy (SNP) has completed a survey of the approximately 600

mosques in Spain. It might be worthwhile having a Spaniard

discuss the results of this work.

LLORENS;"