ID

92466

Etiquetas

PARM PREL, MNUC, MASS, PINS, PTER, SP

Fecha

2007-01-12 17:32:00

RefID

07MADRID71

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

SECRET//NOFORN

Destino

Encabezado

Contenido

VZCZCXRO7157

OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV

DE RUEHMD #0071/01 0121732

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 121732Z JAN 07

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1617

INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0282

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1454

RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0049

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000071

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE; UNVIE FOR AMB SCHULTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017

TAGS: PARM PREL, MNUC, MASS, PINS, PTER, SP

SUBJECT: SPAIN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE RAISES AWARENESS

OF POTENTIAL IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT

Classified By: DCM HUGO LLORENS PER 1.4 (B/D)

-------

SUMMARY

-------

1. (U) UNVIE Ambassador Greg Schulte visited Madrid January

10-11 to raise the awareness of GOS officials and the public

regarding the threat posed by the ongoing Iranian nuclear

weapons program. On the government side, Schulte met with

National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana, Deputy Foreign

Minister Bernadino Leon, and five influential members of the

Congress' Defense and Foreign Relations Commissions (from

both the governing and the major opposition party). Schulte

also met with nonproliferation experts from leading Spanish

think tanks, held a well-attended media roundtable, and

conducted a one-on-one press interview with Spain's leading

conservative daily newspaper.

2. (S/NF) Leon told Schulte that U.S.-European "unity and

pressure" were key in the effort to constrain the Iranian

nuclear weapons program. He said Spain was concerned that a

nuclear weapon-armed Iran could lead Arab states such as

Saudi Arabia and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons and that this

could in turn encourage Spain's neighbors in the Maghreb to

seek such weapons. Leon said that Spain was actively

discouraging Spanish companies from operating in Iran. He

said Spain would support additional EU measures against Iran,

beyond those mandated by UNSCR 1737. He underscored Spain's

enormous faith in EU foreign policy chief (and Spanish

national) Javier Solana and indicated that Spain would

support whatever additional measures Solana tables for EU

consideration. Leon also said that former Spanish Prime

Minister Felipe Gonzalez would not travel to Iran again.

3. (S/NF) Casajuana agreed that unity and pressure were key

but was less forward-leaning in the discussion of possible

additional EU measures beyond UNSCR 1737, stressing that

Europe should wait until IAEA DG ElBaradei tables his next

60-day report (21 February) before considering additional

measures. Casajuana stressed that greater efforts to resolve

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could reduce Iran's regional

influence and thus directly assist efforts to constrain its

nuclear weapons program. He also noted that the safety of

Spanish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan near the border with

Iran and in Lebanon in Iranian-backed Hizbollah controlled

territory impacted on Spain's approach toward Iran.

4. (S/NF) Leon was more sympathetic to Schulte's proposals,

but he has a track record of getting ahead of Spanish policy

and not always fully or quickly delivering on his

commitments. Casajuana's caution was likely a better

indicator of current GOS policy on the Iranian nuclear issue.

That said, Schulte's visit helped insure that Spain will

continue to back the EU3 efforts and that Iran will not be

able to drive wedges between Spain and either the EU3 or the

U.S. However, we do not expect that Spain will take a

leadership position in encouraging the EU to take measures

beyond those mandated in UNSCR 1737. The best way to ensure

Spain's support for additional measures remains via Javier

Solana. END SUMMARY.

-----------------------------------------

MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEON

-----------------------------------------

5. (U) In his meeting with Leon and all other

interlocutors, Schulte stressed that President Bush had

instructed him to work closely with our European allies to

meet the challenge posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons

program. He said that while passage of UNSCR 1737 took

longer than we hoped and was weaker than we liked, it was

still very significant for three reasons: (1) it was passed

unanimously; (2) it places Iran in the company of the likes

of the DPRK and Sudan under Chapter 7 sanctions; and, (3) its

limited sanctions have real bite and have already had an

impact in Tehran. Schulte said that we need to work together

to ensure that UNSCR 1737 is implemented while we wait for

IAEA DG ElBaradei to issue his next 60-day report on February

21. But in the meantime, the U.S., Europe and others (e.g.,

MADRID 00000071 002 OF 004

Japan) need to start escalating pressure on Iran by agreeing

to additional measures beyond those mandated in 1737, while

simultaneously giving Iran a way out by reiterating that the

June 2006 "carrots" package remains on the table. He said

that these additional measures should probably be in the

economic/financial area, and could include reducing exports

credits and prohibiting arms sales to Iran.

6. (S/NF) Leon said that Spain's assessment of Iranian

intentions tracked with that of the U.S. and that the two key

words describing GOS views on this issue were "pressure and

unity." He said that pressure was beginning to modify

Iranian behavior, in part because Iran knows that Europe and

the U.S. are united. Spain will continue to support U.S./EU3

efforts on Iran and senior Spanish officials will continue to

reiterate this in public comments. Leon indicated that Spain

was concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead Arab

states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons

and that this could in turn encourage Spain's neighbors in

the Maghreb to seek such weapons. As a result, Spain had

formed an inter-ministerial working group under former

Spanish Ambassador to Iran Leopoldo Stampa to analyze the

proliferation impact of a nuclear-armed Iran. Leon

encouraged Schulte to meet with Stampa. (Note: Schulte was

not able to do so and Embassy Madrid will ensure that Schulte

is appraised of the results of Stampa's study. End Note).

7. (S/NF) Leon agreed that further economic/financial

measures could help increase the pressure on Iran. He said

that Spain has been telling its companies not to invest in

Iran and has encouraged Spanish companies already in Iran,

such as the BBVA bank, to close down their Iranian

operations. He said BBVA, the only Spanish bank active in

Iran, was in the process of closing down its Iranian

operations and that Iran was doing all it could to slow

BBVA's departure. Leon underscored that Spain would support

whatever additional measures Javier Solana comes up with.

"Javier has the lead; what he tables, we will support." Leon

closed his remarks by repeating that Spain fully backs the

EU3 and that there is a "very strong consensus within the EU"

on Iran.

8. (S/NF) Ambassador Aguirre, who accompanied Schulte to

the meeting, thanked Leon for GOS support in preventing a

recent civil aircraft sale by a Spanish company to Iran

(reported septel) and underscored the need for increased

vigilance, as Iran will certainly attempt to woo Spanish

companies to fill gaps created by the departure of other

European companies. He said that the U.S. and Spain must

continue to work together to keep Spanish companies out of

Iran. He also raised former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe

Gonzalez's travel last year to Iran, noting that this sent a

mixed message. Leon said that Gonzalez had fully briefed

senior Spanish and U.S. officials about his travel and that

his involvement "was now over." He repeated that "Felipe has

decided not to travel to Iran again" but noted that Gonzalez

remained available as a mediator should we ever need him.

--------------------------------------------- ---

MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CASAJUANA

--------------------------------------------- ---

9. (S/NF) Schulte, who was accompanied by the DCM, repeated

his message outlined in paragraph four above, stressing that

when the U.S. and Europe are apart, bad things happen, and

that when we are together, we can stop wars. He mentioned

that Leon had emphasized pressure and unity in his meeting

the previous day. Casajuana said that Leon had stolen his

talking points and underscored that the key point was to

maintain and strengthen the U.S.-EU consensus on the Iranian

nuclear program. He said that Spain would fully implement

UNSCR 1737 and had already taken measures to do so.

Casajuana agreed that putting Iran under Chapter 7 sanctions

had had a big psychological impact on Iran and that it was

time to "strengthen our position and unity on Iran." He

noted that Spain was not in either the UNSC of the EU3 and

would "follow U.S. and EU3 leadership on Iran." He stressed

that Spain would in particular support Solana's Iran efforts.

Casajuana said that during his visit to Spain late last

year, Iranian negotiator Larijani was clearly told that Iran

MADRID 00000071 003 OF 004

must comply with the demands of the U.S./EU3. "We closed the

door to all back ways of dialogue and negotiation and told

Larijani to negotiate with Solana."

10. (S/NF) Regarding additional measures beyond those

contained in UNSCR 1737, Casajuana said "we need to think"

and "should not be in a hurry." He said we should wait until

ElBaradei delivers the next 60-day report on February 21

before engaging seriously on additional measures. Casajuana

said Spain could support additional measures if Russia and

China were on board. His message was "keep the consensus and

build on it, even it takes longer than we like." He said

that we also needed to continually remind the Iranian

government and people of the carrots on the table (i.e., that

there is a way out that would allow Iran to have a peaceful

nuclear program and gain significant western cooperation).

11. (S/NF) Schulte said that Iran was clearly trying to

drive wedges between Russia/China and the U.S/EU3 and had

also tried to drive wedges between Spain/Italy and the EU3.

He said we appreciated Spain's clear "no" to Iran's attempts.

He agreed on the need to reiterate the carrot offer and

better explain it to the Iranian people. Schulte underscored

that Europe has economic/financial leverage over Iran and

needs to use it now via additional measures beyond those in

UNSCR 1737. He stressed that while the U.S. used to handle

the sticks and the EU the carrots, the U.S. had agreed to

join the June 2006 carrot package and it was now time for the

EU to do more on the stick side via additional measures.

12. (S/NF) Casajuana said that Iran's emergence as a

regional power was making it feel immune to our pressure. He

said that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as

the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, had increased Iranian

regional influence. Reducing that influence might help our

efforts to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons

program. One way to do this, he noted, would be through

greater efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

He also said that the presence of 700 Spanish troops in

Afghanistan, many of them near the border with Iran, and

1,100 Spanish troops in Hizbollah-controlled territory in

Lebanon means that Iran could easily "make mischief" for

Spain. While arguing that this factor was not linked to

Spain's Iran policy, Casajuana underscored that "this is

always in our minds."

13. (S/NF) Schulte stressed that Secretary Rice would make

greater efforts on the Israeli-Palestinain conflict over the

coming two years and that the outcome in Iraq would also have

great influence on Iranian behavior. If we succeed in Iraq,

Iranian influence would be reduced. But if we fail, it would

boost both Iran and terrorism. He underscored that Iran was

already killing coalition soldiers in Iraq via the provision

of sophisticated IED technology.

14. (S/NF) The conversation ended with Casajuana

reiterating the need to wait for the next 60-day report

before considering further measures and Schulte reiterating

that the EU needs to undertake such measures now. Schulte

concluded by noting that Prime Minister Zapatero had told

Ambassador Aguirre in their first meeting that Iran was our

greatest long-term security challenge. President Bush agrees

and the time for both the U.S. and Europe to act is now.

-------

COMMENT

-------

15. (S/NF) Leon was more sympathetic than Casajuana to

Schulte's message. But Leon has a track record of getting

ahead of Spanish policy and is not always able to fully or

quickly deliver on his commitments. While Leon's comments

about encouraging Spanish companies and Felipe Gonzalez to

stay out of Iran were probably accurate, Casajuana's caution

was likely a more accurate reflection of overall GOS policy

on the Iranian nuclear issue. That said, Schulte's visit

will help insure that Spain will continue to back the EU3

efforts and that Iran will not be able to drive wedges

between Spain and either the EU3 or the U.S. However, as

Casajuana clearly signaled, we do not expect Spain to take a

MADRID 00000071 004 OF 004

leadership position in encouraging the EU to take measures

beyond those mandated in UNSCR 1737. The best way to ensure

Spain's support for additional measures remains via Javier

Solana. If Solana can build a EU consensus around additional

measures, Spain will almost certainly support it.

.

Aguirre;"