Wikileaks

ESPAÑA NO PRESIONÓ A IRÁN POR TEMOR A SU POTENCIAL NUCLEAR

Cable sobre la visita de Schulte para presionar al Gobierno español

  • El represetante nuclear de EE UU visitó Madrid en 2007.
  • Quería sumar a España a un grupo de presión contra Irán.
  • España se negó por miedo a represalias a sus soldados en Líbano y Afganistán.
ID:
92466
Etiquetas:
PARM PREL, MNUC, MASS, PINS, PTER, SP
Fecha:
2007-01-12 17:32:00
RefID:
07MADRID71
Origen:
Embassy Madrid
Clasificación:
SECRET//NOFORN
Destino:
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Encabezado:
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VZCZCXRO7157
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DE RUEHMD #0071/01 0121732
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121732Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1617
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0282
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1454
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0049
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000071

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE; UNVIE FOR AMB SCHULTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL, MNUC, MASS, PINS, PTER, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE RAISES AWARENESS
OF POTENTIAL IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT

Classified By: DCM HUGO LLORENS PER 1.4 (B/D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

1. (U) UNVIE Ambassador Greg Schulte visited Madrid January
10-11 to raise the awareness of GOS officials and the public
regarding the threat posed by the ongoing Iranian nuclear
weapons program. On the government side, Schulte met with
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana, Deputy Foreign
Minister Bernadino Leon, and five influential members of the
Congress' Defense and Foreign Relations Commissions (from
both the governing and the major opposition party). Schulte
also met with nonproliferation experts from leading Spanish
think tanks, held a well-attended media roundtable, and
conducted a one-on-one press interview with Spain's leading
conservative daily newspaper.

2. (S/NF) Leon told Schulte that U.S.-European "unity and
pressure" were key in the effort to constrain the Iranian
nuclear weapons program. He said Spain was concerned that a
nuclear weapon-armed Iran could lead Arab states such as
Saudi Arabia and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons and that this
could in turn encourage Spain's neighbors in the Maghreb to
seek such weapons. Leon said that Spain was actively
discouraging Spanish companies from operating in Iran. He
said Spain would support additional EU measures against Iran,
beyond those mandated by UNSCR 1737. He underscored Spain's
enormous faith in EU foreign policy chief (and Spanish
national) Javier Solana and indicated that Spain would
support whatever additional measures Solana tables for EU
consideration. Leon also said that former Spanish Prime
Minister Felipe Gonzalez would not travel to Iran again.

3. (S/NF) Casajuana agreed that unity and pressure were key
but was less forward-leaning in the discussion of possible
additional EU measures beyond UNSCR 1737, stressing that
Europe should wait until IAEA DG ElBaradei tables his next
60-day report (21 February) before considering additional
measures. Casajuana stressed that greater efforts to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could reduce Iran's regional
influence and thus directly assist efforts to constrain its
nuclear weapons program. He also noted that the safety of
Spanish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan near the border with
Iran and in Lebanon in Iranian-backed Hizbollah controlled
territory impacted on Spain's approach toward Iran.

4. (S/NF) Leon was more sympathetic to Schulte's proposals,
but he has a track record of getting ahead of Spanish policy
and not always fully or quickly delivering on his
commitments. Casajuana's caution was likely a better
indicator of current GOS policy on the Iranian nuclear issue.
That said, Schulte's visit helped insure that Spain will
continue to back the EU3 efforts and that Iran will not be
able to drive wedges between Spain and either the EU3 or the
U.S. However, we do not expect that Spain will take a
leadership position in encouraging the EU to take measures
beyond those mandated in UNSCR 1737. The best way to ensure
Spain's support for additional measures remains via Javier
Solana. END SUMMARY.

-----------------------------------------
MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEON
-----------------------------------------

5. (U) In his meeting with Leon and all other
interlocutors, Schulte stressed that President Bush had
instructed him to work closely with our European allies to
meet the challenge posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons
program. He said that while passage of UNSCR 1737 took
longer than we hoped and was weaker than we liked, it was
still very significant for three reasons: (1) it was passed
unanimously; (2) it places Iran in the company of the likes
of the DPRK and Sudan under Chapter 7 sanctions; and, (3) its
limited sanctions have real bite and have already had an
impact in Tehran. Schulte said that we need to work together
to ensure that UNSCR 1737 is implemented while we wait for
IAEA DG ElBaradei to issue his next 60-day report on February
21. But in the meantime, the U.S., Europe and others (e.g.,

MADRID 00000071 002 OF 004

Japan) need to start escalating pressure on Iran by agreeing
to additional measures beyond those mandated in 1737, while
simultaneously giving Iran a way out by reiterating that the
June 2006 "carrots" package remains on the table. He said
that these additional measures should probably be in the
economic/financial area, and could include reducing exports
credits and prohibiting arms sales to Iran.

6. (S/NF) Leon said that Spain's assessment of Iranian
intentions tracked with that of the U.S. and that the two key
words describing GOS views on this issue were "pressure and
unity." He said that pressure was beginning to modify
Iranian behavior, in part because Iran knows that Europe and
the U.S. are united. Spain will continue to support U.S./EU3
efforts on Iran and senior Spanish officials will continue to
reiterate this in public comments. Leon indicated that Spain
was concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead Arab
states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons
and that this could in turn encourage Spain's neighbors in
the Maghreb to seek such weapons. As a result, Spain had
formed an inter-ministerial working group under former
Spanish Ambassador to Iran Leopoldo Stampa to analyze the
proliferation impact of a nuclear-armed Iran. Leon
encouraged Schulte to meet with Stampa. (Note: Schulte was
not able to do so and Embassy Madrid will ensure that Schulte
is appraised of the results of Stampa's study. End Note).

7. (S/NF) Leon agreed that further economic/financial
measures could help increase the pressure on Iran. He said
that Spain has been telling its companies not to invest in
Iran and has encouraged Spanish companies already in Iran,
such as the BBVA bank, to close down their Iranian
operations. He said BBVA, the only Spanish bank active in
Iran, was in the process of closing down its Iranian
operations and that Iran was doing all it could to slow
BBVA's departure. Leon underscored that Spain would support
whatever additional measures Javier Solana comes up with.
"Javier has the lead; what he tables, we will support." Leon
closed his remarks by repeating that Spain fully backs the
EU3 and that there is a "very strong consensus within the EU"
on Iran.

8. (S/NF) Ambassador Aguirre, who accompanied Schulte to
the meeting, thanked Leon for GOS support in preventing a
recent civil aircraft sale by a Spanish company to Iran
(reported septel) and underscored the need for increased
vigilance, as Iran will certainly attempt to woo Spanish
companies to fill gaps created by the departure of other
European companies. He said that the U.S. and Spain must
continue to work together to keep Spanish companies out of
Iran. He also raised former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe
Gonzalez's travel last year to Iran, noting that this sent a
mixed message. Leon said that Gonzalez had fully briefed
senior Spanish and U.S. officials about his travel and that
his involvement "was now over." He repeated that "Felipe has
decided not to travel to Iran again" but noted that Gonzalez
remained available as a mediator should we ever need him.

--------------------------------------------- ---
MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CASAJUANA
--------------------------------------------- ---

9. (S/NF) Schulte, who was accompanied by the DCM, repeated
his message outlined in paragraph four above, stressing that
when the U.S. and Europe are apart, bad things happen, and
that when we are together, we can stop wars. He mentioned
that Leon had emphasized pressure and unity in his meeting
the previous day. Casajuana said that Leon had stolen his
talking points and underscored that the key point was to
maintain and strengthen the U.S.-EU consensus on the Iranian
nuclear program. He said that Spain would fully implement
UNSCR 1737 and had already taken measures to do so.
Casajuana agreed that putting Iran under Chapter 7 sanctions
had had a big psychological impact on Iran and that it was
time to "strengthen our position and unity on Iran." He
noted that Spain was not in either the UNSC of the EU3 and
would "follow U.S. and EU3 leadership on Iran." He stressed
that Spain would in particular support Solana's Iran efforts.
Casajuana said that during his visit to Spain late last
year, Iranian negotiator Larijani was clearly told that Iran

MADRID 00000071 003 OF 004

must comply with the demands of the U.S./EU3. "We closed the
door to all back ways of dialogue and negotiation and told
Larijani to negotiate with Solana."

10. (S/NF) Regarding additional measures beyond those
contained in UNSCR 1737, Casajuana said "we need to think"
and "should not be in a hurry." He said we should wait until
ElBaradei delivers the next 60-day report on February 21
before engaging seriously on additional measures. Casajuana
said Spain could support additional measures if Russia and
China were on board. His message was "keep the consensus and
build on it, even it takes longer than we like." He said
that we also needed to continually remind the Iranian
government and people of the carrots on the table (i.e., that
there is a way out that would allow Iran to have a peaceful
nuclear program and gain significant western cooperation).

11. (S/NF) Schulte said that Iran was clearly trying to
drive wedges between Russia/China and the U.S/EU3 and had
also tried to drive wedges between Spain/Italy and the EU3.
He said we appreciated Spain's clear "no" to Iran's attempts.
He agreed on the need to reiterate the carrot offer and
better explain it to the Iranian people. Schulte underscored
that Europe has economic/financial leverage over Iran and
needs to use it now via additional measures beyond those in
UNSCR 1737. He stressed that while the U.S. used to handle
the sticks and the EU the carrots, the U.S. had agreed to
join the June 2006 carrot package and it was now time for the
EU to do more on the stick side via additional measures.

12. (S/NF) Casajuana said that Iran's emergence as a
regional power was making it feel immune to our pressure. He
said that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, had increased Iranian
regional influence. Reducing that influence might help our
efforts to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons
program. One way to do this, he noted, would be through
greater efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
He also said that the presence of 700 Spanish troops in
Afghanistan, many of them near the border with Iran, and
1,100 Spanish troops in Hizbollah-controlled territory in
Lebanon means that Iran could easily "make mischief" for
Spain. While arguing that this factor was not linked to
Spain's Iran policy, Casajuana underscored that "this is
always in our minds."

13. (S/NF) Schulte stressed that Secretary Rice would make
greater efforts on the Israeli-Palestinain conflict over the
coming two years and that the outcome in Iraq would also have
great influence on Iranian behavior. If we succeed in Iraq,
Iranian influence would be reduced. But if we fail, it would
boost both Iran and terrorism. He underscored that Iran was
already killing coalition soldiers in Iraq via the provision
of sophisticated IED technology.

14. (S/NF) The conversation ended with Casajuana
reiterating the need to wait for the next 60-day report
before considering further measures and Schulte reiterating
that the EU needs to undertake such measures now. Schulte
concluded by noting that Prime Minister Zapatero had told
Ambassador Aguirre in their first meeting that Iran was our
greatest long-term security challenge. President Bush agrees
and the time for both the U.S. and Europe to act is now.

-------
COMMENT
-------

15. (S/NF) Leon was more sympathetic than Casajuana to
Schulte's message. But Leon has a track record of getting
ahead of Spanish policy and is not always able to fully or
quickly deliver on his commitments. While Leon's comments
about encouraging Spanish companies and Felipe Gonzalez to
stay out of Iran were probably accurate, Casajuana's caution
was likely a more accurate reflection of overall GOS policy
on the Iranian nuclear issue. That said, Schulte's visit
will help insure that Spain will continue to back the EU3
efforts and that Iran will not be able to drive wedges
between Spain and either the EU3 or the U.S. However, as
Casajuana clearly signaled, we do not expect Spain to take a

MADRID 00000071 004 OF 004

leadership position in encouraging the EU to take measures
beyond those mandated in UNSCR 1737. The best way to ensure
Spain's support for additional measures remains via Javier
Solana. If Solana can build a EU consensus around additional
measures, Spain will almost certainly support it.
.
Aguirre;"