ID

23992

Etiquetas

PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP, American - Spanish Relations

Fecha

2004-12-13 15:50:00

RefID

04MADRID4687

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

Encabezado

Contenido

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 004687

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP, American - Spanish Relations

SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM LEON ON CUBA, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Classified By: Charge Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Summary. Charge met with Deputy Foreign Minister

Bernardino Leon on 12/9 to discuss GOS-USG differences on

Cuba, overall bilateral relations, and Spanish participation

in NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leon conveyed GOS

displeasure with recent comments by WHA A/S Noriega

criticizing GOS efforts to spur greater EU engagement with

the Cuban Government. He said the MFA Director General for

Latin America would like to visit Washington to clarify the

Spanish position, but that he could not do so without either

gaining political cover for such a visit in the form of a

neutral USG statement or waiting a suitable period to allow

the episode to fade. Leon underscored Spain's determination

to press forward with its new Cuba policy. On bilateral

relations, Leon claimed that the opposition Popular Party

(PP) is trying to foment USG-GOS tensions for internal

political purposes. He said the GOS genuinely wants good

relations and will soon name a Special Envoy to the U.S. to

promote better high-level relations. Leon asserted that

President Bush's November meeting with King Juan Carlos had

revealed possible "misunderstandings" on the part of the USG

with respect to the GOS, including the "misperception" that

Zapatero represents the left wing of the Socialist Party. On

Iraq, Leon indicated that the January elections may represent

an opportunity for the GOS to deepen its involvement, though

participation in a NATO mission on the ground remains a

sensitive issue. The GOS is prepared to send forces to

Afghanistan to help with the next round of elections, but

remains non-commital on leading a PRT.

2. (C) The GOS seems to understand the political liability of

having poor relations with the USG and some, like Leon, are

doing what they can to at least superficially improve ties.

We expect they will keep asking us to "watch their actions

rather than their words." We will continue to press for both

more favorable actions and more favorable words. On Cuba, it

is telling that the GOS felt sufficiently stung by A/S

Noriega's comments to seek the public support of Chirac in a

high-level meeting on 12/8. If Sandomingo does visit the

Department in the next few weeks, it is important that he

understand the depth of USG skepticism with respect to

Spain's efforts to weaken EU policy towards Cuba. We will

not shift Madrid's course from greater engagement with

Castro, but a sense that the USG is determined to hold the

line may discourage the GOS from pushing the EU towards even

greater rapprochement with Havana. End Summary.

//CUBA DOMINATES THE DISCUSSION//

3. (C) Leon began by saying that he primarily wanted to speak

with Charge regarding the USG's views on Spanish policy

towards Cuba, and in particular recent comments by WHA A/S

Noriega to the effect that the GOS had been manipulated by

Castro regime in pursuing its new policy of engagement. What

especially rankled the MFA about USG's comments was the

implication that the GOS was somehow pro-Castro. Leon

insisted that President Zapatero and FM Moratinos had

maintained a consistent policy of placing democratic reforms

as a pre-condition for improved EU ties with Cuba. He said

that Spain had worked within the EU Common Position and

merely wanted to modify the Restrictive Measures on Cuba,

"which have proven ineffective," in order to develop a more

sustainable EU-wide position. Leon claimed the majority of

EU countries wanted to change the policy and said that the

Restrictive Measures had been undermined from the start by

the refusal of some missions in Havana (the Austrians,

Belgians, Portuguese, and Greeks, he claimed) to invite

dissidents to national day events. He asserted that the UK

had also changed tack in favor of greater engagement with

Cuba because PM Blair was attempting to burnish his

"progressive" credentials and said it was his understanding

that the UK Embassy in Havana planned to join the above EU

missions in finding a way around inviting dissidents to its

national day. The solution in his view was to replace the

current measures with a broadly-supported policy of deeper

engagement with the opposition, but at a level less visible

than invitations to national day events.

4. (C) In the interest of clarifying Spain's actions towards

Cuba, Leon said he was eager to send DG for Latin America

Javier Sandomingo to meet with A/S Noriega. However, he said

the GOS could not do so politically without seeming to be

responding to a summons from Washington. Leon said the

problem was complicated by the presence of pro-PP diplomats

in the Spanish Embassy in Washington who might leak slanted

information to news services hostile to the Zapatero

administration. He suggested two possible courses of action:

-- That the Department make a neutral public statement

regarding Spanish policy towards Cuba to the effect that each

country had the right to determine its own best course for

stimulating democratic reforms, immediately after which

Sandomingo would travel to Washington; or,

-- If the USG could not make such a statement, then the

GOS would wait a few days (more than a week) before sending

Sandomingo in order to place an appropriate period of time

between A/S Noriega's comments and Sandomingo's travel.

5. (C) Charge replied that he would relay the suggestions to

Washington, but that in either case it was important that

Sandomingo travel to Washington to clarify Spain's view of

how to move forward on Cuba. Charge added that A/S Noriega's

comments may have upset some in the GOS, but they accurately

reflected USG skepticism of Spain's direction on Cuba. In

particular, the USG was concerned by Spain's decision to take

the lead in bringing about the end of EU invitations to

dissidents to EU national day events. The negative symbolism

and damage to the morale of the opposition - essentially

telling them that they were not legitimate political actors -

outweighed any advantage of renewed engagement.

6. (C) Leon said that, far from distancing the EU from the

opposition, the GOS proposed broader engagement, just in a

different format than national day events. "After eight

years of Aznar's hard line towards Cuba, the EU has not

advanced its objectives with respect to improved human

rights. We want to try a different approach." Leon said

that it is clear to the GOS that Castro will not be

overthrown and that it is more important that Spain be in a

position to influence the next set of leaders. He said that

it was in Spain (and the USG's) interest to promote a soft

landing for the next Cuban leaders rather than an explosive

transition leading, perhaps, to the need for USG

intervention. He said the GOS and the USG should work

together to make their different approaches complement each

other. Charge reiterated that USG held reservations

regarding the effectiveness of the Spanish approach. Leon

said that Spain and the EU can only make overtures to Castro

- if he rejects them then the imposition of new EU

restrictive measures would be possible.

//U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS//

7. (C) Leon said that Spain is politically divided at the

moment, as demonstrated by the PP's decision to adopt an

aggressive posture towards the GOS in hopes of bringing down

the government and forcing early elections. He claimed that

PP leaders, including former President Aznar and former FM

Ana Palacio, were trying to use their contacts in Washington

to shape USG opinion against Zapatero. The PP's objective,

he said, is to use bilateral friction between the USG and the

GOS as part of its campaign to unseat FM Moratinos, and

eventually Zapatero. Leon said it was important for USG

officials, such as A/S Noriega, to understand that even

comments in seemingly innocuous settings can get picked up by

the press and have an impact far beyond that intended by the

speaker.

8. (C) Charge noted that we had been sending an identical

message to GOS officials, with mixed success. For example,

the visit of King Juan Carlos sent an excellent, positive

message regarding the importance of our bilateral relations,

but the positive effect had been negated by the simultaneous

visit of Venezuelan President Chavez to Madrid. All of the

good news from the King's visit was drowned out by three days

of Chavez' revolutionary rhetoric and tirades against the USG

while standing next to Spanish officials.

9. (C) Leon agreed that the Chavez visit had been a public

relations failure, adding that the GOS only invited Chavez

after months of requests from Chavez. Turning to the King's

meeting with President Bush, Leon said that there might be

some "misunderstandings" on the part of the USG regarding the

GOS. He said that when King Juan Carlos had raised Spain's

exclusion from November White House briefings on the Middle

East to which other European (G-8) countries had been

invited, President Bush, the King said, expressed surprise

and reassured the King that Spain would be invited to future

such meetings.

10. (C) According to Leon, the King also commented on the

importance of popular sentiment against Spanish deployment of

troops to Iraq in Zapatero's decision to withdraw those

forces. However, Zapatero sent troops to Afghanistan as a

gesture of solidarity with the USG in the fight against

terrorism. Leon said President Bush evinced surprise about

the information on Spain's deployment to Afghanistan.

Separately, Leon said he was surprised to hear that former

President Bush had reportedly mused that President Zapatero

might be further to the left politically than former

President Felipe Gonzalez, with whom the USG had enjoyed good

relations. Leon insisted that Zapatero and Moratinos

represented Spain's version of "New Labour" and that both

leaders were well within the political mainstream.

//SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE U.S.//

11. (C) Leon said the GOS is fully cognizant of the

importance of good relations with Washington and

"confidentially" shared that Zapatero will soon name

Socialist Parliamentarian Rafael Estrella as special envoy to

the U.S. Estrella, who is known for his pro-U.S. views, will

travel frequently to the U.S. to promote strong high-level

ties. (COMMENT: This appointment could, and probably will

be, interpreted as a further sign of the MFA's lack of

confidence in their Embassy in Washington. END COMMENT) In

a similar vein, Leon said the GOS plans to name pro-U.S.

Socialists to head the "Real Instituto Elcano," Spain's

premier think tank, which in the Spanish system is partly

directed by the ruling political party.

//MORE FLEXIBLE ON IRAQ?//

12. (C) Charge drew Leon's attention to the importance of

allowing Spanish forces assigned to NATO commands to

participate in all NATO missions, including missions in Iraq.

Leon said that the issue remained very sensitive for the GOS

and that there are different schools of thought both within

the MFA and among Zapatero's advisers as to how to proceed.

The GOS will look to the successful conclusion of the Iraqi

elections as a benchmark that may allow Spanish forces to

participate more fully. Leon indicated much greater

political support for providing Spanish training for Iraqi

police forces outside of Iraq.

//AFGHANISTAN PRT//

13. (C) Charge urged Leon to support Spanish leadership of a

PRT in Afghanistan. Leon said that the GOS was prepared to

provide additional forces immediately to support the next

round of elections, and, if that went well, to participate in

a PRT. He did not indicate willingness to have Spain lead a

PRT. Leon noted that, due to new legislation, the GOS now

requires Parliamentary approval of any deployment of Spanish

forces overseas, making strong political support for any

mission an even more critical component for the GOS.

//USG SUPPORT FOR UNSYG ANNAN//

14. (C) Charge raised local press reports indicating that

President Zapatero and French President Chirac had voiced

strong support for the continued UN leadership of UNSYG

Annan. The press reports implied that Zapatero and Chirac

were countering USG efforts to undermine Annan. Charge said

this was not the case and shared copies of Department

statements indicating strong USG support for Annan. He said

it was important that the GOS not misinterpret USG intentions

with respect to the oil-for-food investigation. (NOTE:

During the Zapatero-Chirac meeting, Chirac also stated his

support for Spain's efforts to weaken EU measures against

Cuba and attacked USG criticism of Spain's overtures to

Castro. END NOTE.)

//COMMENT//

15. (C) The GOS seems to understand the political liability

of having poor relations with the USG and some, like Leon,

will do what they can to at least superficially heal the

damage. We expect they will keep asking us to "watch their

actions rather than their words." We will continue to press

for both more favorable actions and more favorable words. On

Cuba, it is telling that the GOS felt sufficiently stung by

A/S Noriega's comments to seek the public support of Chirac

in a high-level meeting. If Sandomingo does visit the

Department in the next few weeks, it is important that he

understand the depth of USG skepticism with respect to

Spain's efforts to weaken EU policy towards Cuba. We will

not shift Madrid's course from greater engagement with

Castro, but a sense that the USG is determined to hold the

line may discourage the GOS from pushing the EU towards even

greater rapprochement with Havana.

MANZANARES;"