Cable en el que Estados Unidos y España discuten su colaboración en el plan BMENA del G-8

  • Un delegado estadounidense pide consejo a España por su experiencia de diez años con el Proceso de Barcelona.
  • La Alianza de Civilizaciones está a punto de anunciar la composición de su Grupo de Alto Nivel.
  • España dice a EE UU que la iniciativa extrapolará los objetivos de BMENA al contexto de la ONU.

ID

28719

Etiquetas

PREL, PGOV, SP

Fecha

2005-03-14 14:58:00

RefID

05MADRID960

Origen

Embassy Madrid

Clasificación

CONFIDENTIAL

Destino

Encabezado

Contenido

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000960

SIPDIS

@ELIMINADO@

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2015

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP

SUBJECT: BMENA - POSSIBILITY FOR COOPERATION WITH SPAIN

Classified By: POL @ELIMINADO@ for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: @ELIMINADO@ met with Spanish MFA

officials, including Political Director Rafael Dezcallar,

Barcelona Process Ambassador Juan Prat and Near East Division

DAS-equivalent Alberto Moreno, in Madrid on March 7 as part

of the effort to forge greater U.S.-Spain and U.S.-EU

cooperation on BMENA. The Spanish officials support

coordination and division of labor, if the U.S. and EU

political messages to the region are similar. Madrid prefers

coordination on the national or sub-regional level. Greater

explanation of the benefits and provision of incentives for

democracy and reform is key. Madrid believes that the

Islamist PJD will win Morocco's 2007 elections and that

agreement is needed on how to engage Islamists in BMENA. A

solution to W. Sahara is key to providing the economic growth

needed in N. Africa and a new representative is needed. FM

Moratinos will ask for greater inclusion of Spain in G-8

BMENA activities from Secretary Rice during his visit to

Washington in April. He will also suggest that Middle East

liaison officers be posted in Washington and Madrid and will

request a formal annual dialog to exchange views on the

Middle East at that time. END SUMMARY

2.(C) @ELIMINADO@held a day long series of

meetings at the MFA in Madrid March 7th with: Policy Director

Rafael Dezcallar, MFA Barcelona Process Ambassador Juan Prat

and divisional Deputy DGs Carlos Fernandez-Arias (N. Africa),

Antonio Moreno (ME) and Manual del la Camara (N. America).

The purpose of the meetings was to elicit Spanish support for

greater U.S.-EU cooperation on policy and assistance

programming in the Broader Middle East and to discover the

GOS's views on how democracy and reform can be promoted

effectively in the region.

3.(C) @ELIMINADO@ stated that the USG was interested in

lessons that the GOS has learned from the 10-year Barcelona

process. He asked if Spain was happy with the results and

what its view is on attaching greater conditionality to

foreign assistance. @ELIMINADO@ asked the GOS about the

possible scope for greater consultation and coordination

between the U.S. and EU on political messages and foreign

assistance programming in BMENA. He explained that the USG

had concluded that it had contributed to the causes of

violence by over-emphasizing regional stability in the past.

The USG allowed BMENA governments to suppress and drive

political opposition to violence. The USG now believes that

greater democracy is needed in the region in order to coax

political opposition into the mainstream and away from

violence. Some short-term instability may therefore be

needed to achieve the long-term stability that both the USG

and the GOS are seeking in BMENA.

------------------

Strategic Overview

------------------

4.(C) Policy Director Dezcallar started off by reminding @ELIMINADO@ that Spain is active in every region of the world

but the Far East. Latin America and the Mediterranean are

strategic for Spain. Within the Mediterranean, North Africa

and Palestine are areas of particular strategic interest.

The EU's Barcelona Process is a Spanish creation: "we have to

find a way to put the two contexts together ... BMENA and

Barcelona can be perfect complements".

5.(C) Dezcallar argued that the USG would gain by involving

Spain in the G-8 BMENA initiative either ad hoc in discrete

programs and activities or by inviting Spain to participate

in the forthcoming Forum for the Future meeting in Bahrain in

some manner. He intimated that FM Moratinos will ask

Secretary Rice to find a way to be more inclusive of Spain in

SIPDIS

the G-8 BMENA process in his forthcoming April visit to

Washington.

6.(C) Dezcallar said it is important to update the content of

the Barcelona Process. Spain fully supports the new European

Neighborhood Policy whereby the EU's previously separate East

European and Mediterranean assistance programs will be

combined and "action plans" are being developed for each

beneficiary country along the EU's periphery. In an allusion

to the competition for resources between Southern EU members

focused on the Mediterranean and new EU members focused on

Eastern Europe, Dezcallar stated that a lot more money would

be required to make the Neighborhood Policy successful. He

noted that the GOS had committed to increase foreign

assistance from 0.25 to 0.50 percent of GDP, in this

connection.

7.(C) As long as the political messages being delivered to

the BMENA region are similar, the GOS fully supports

coordination of U.S. and EU foreign assistance and sees room

for a division of labor between the U.S. and EU. (Comment:

How much movement is required from either side towards the

other in order to make the messages similar was left

unclear.) Dezcallar suggested including some statement on

cooperation in the forthcoming 10th anniversary celebration

of the Transatlantic Agenda.

8.(C) The key to success in Dezcallar's view is to convince

BMENA countries that democracy and more aggressive economic,

educational, and social reforms are in their interest. The

GOS can facilitate the reception of the political message due

to the particular nature of its relations with BMENA

countries. He pointed out that the way in which the political

message is packaged is very important in the Arab world.

9.(C) Dezcallar closed discussion of BMENA by suggesting that

the USG and GOS post Middle East liaison officers in their

respective embassies and that the GOS and USG meet formally

once a year to exchange views on the Middle East. (COMMENT:

By seeking closer coordination with the USG on BMENA, Spain

may be attempting both to put itself on a par with Paris and

London and to gain leverage in the intra-European competition

for resources. Madrid may think that BMENA is more important

currently to the USG than assistance to E. Europe. The GOS

may thus believe that by having greater insight into USG

thinking it can sway EU foreign assistance resource

allocation decisions towards N. Africa. END COMMENT).

10.(C) Finally, Dezcallar touched on PM Zapatero's "Alliance

of Civilizations" initiative. U/S Dobriansky has been briefed

on the concept by the GOS and UN SecGen Annan will soon

announce a high-level group (HLG) in support of the

initiative. He argued that the initiative would allow the

ideas behind BMENA to be extrapolated to the UN context. The

message on the need for reform in the Islamic world would

arrive not just from the North but from Islamic countries of

the South who had themselves been the victims of terror. The

GOS will send a special ambassador to the U.S. to explain the

concept in detail. Spain would like the USG to participate in

the HLG and will formally request such participation during

Moratinos' forthcoming visit.

---------------------

The Barcelona Process

---------------------

11.(C) Barcelona Process ambassador Juan Prat led off a

session with N. Africa, ME and N. America Deputy DGs

Fernandez-Arias, Moreno and de la Camara by stating that the

U.S. and EU shared the same goal of accelerating reform but

had differing approaches. Calling for greater efficiency in

the execution of assistance from the Commission, Prat stated

that Barcelona had been a big success, despite the fact that

it had not achieved all of its goals.

12.(C) Little progress has been made in Barcelona's political

and security "basket", because it has become "polluted" by

lack of progress on the peace process. And Barcelona has not

achieved the expansion of civil society in the region, which

the GOS seeks. The economic and financial basket, by

contrast, has been a success. Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan

have launched structural adjustment programs. The EU is

successfully pushing greater private sector involvement and

trade between the Southern Med and Europe has risen by 30%.

The EU is not spending enough on Barcelona's educational and

cultural basket and redressing this defect will be a priority

of the British EU presidency. Prat stressed the need to

increase exchanges and projects targeting women's

empowerment, in this connection.

13.(C) Prat reiterated the GOS view that the U.S. and EU have

to coordinate more closely. The national and sub-regional

levels would likely be the most fruitful area in which to

achieve concrete results.

14.(C) The GOS is concerned that pushing democratization in

countries with no tradition of democracy could lead to the

election of Islamists.@ELIMINADO@ pointed out that one could

either provide a safety valve for social discontent now, or

face dealing with more radical Islamists later. According to

Prat, the GOS position is "yes" to accelerating political

reform. "We can't have a second Algeria. We have to let the

Islamists come into power", seconded Moreno. However, a

debate is underway in Europe on how to handle the Islamic

groups that will inevitably gain representation or control.

Should the EU start dealing with moderate Islamists? Is there

such a thing as moderate Islamists? If so, can they be

trusted? The EU needs a common position. Camara noted that

the prospect of EU accession had provided a check on

Islamists in Turkey and had provided a strong means by which

to justify difficult reforms to the Turkish people.

15.(C) BMENA governments and populations have to be given

something similar to look forward to - something that they

could not achieve without undertaking the difficult reforms

being asked of them. The U.S. and EU have to exert pressure

to start reforms, but also have to show how these reforms

will lead to well being. The U.S. and EU need to think

together how they can provide incentives. It will need a lot

of money. Moreno noted that the EU has traditionally been

poor at attaching credible conditions when providing funds

and argued that much more thought is required on striking the

right balance between too much and too little pressure.

---------------------

North African Roundup

---------------------

16.(C) After pointing out that N. Africans distrust BMENA,

because they do not understand it, Fernandez-Arias focused on

two macroscopic challenges: Western Sahara and housing. He

highlighted the need to create mortgage markets if housing is

ever to be produced in the volume required by demographic

pressure. Western Sahara is preventing the sub-regional

integration needed to make N. Africa an attractive market for

investors and is therefore the principal impediment to

kick-starting much needed economic growth. "We need a

Baker-style representative ... When Baker was there things

were moving because he could get White House attention. So

Morocco and Algeria showed interest".

17.(C) Algeria is not particularly interested in EuroMed or

BMENA. The Algerians, according to Arias, don't need money

and don't want pressure.

18.(C) Morocco on the other hand needs money and is willing

to accept conditionality, as long as it is done in a way that

does not injure national pride. Spain is not getting the

results it wants in Morocco. Political and economic reforms

are happening, but they are not touching the lives of

ordinary people. This exacerbates the gap between rich and

poor and Islamists are gaining in popularity as a result. The

GOS believes that the PJD will win Morocco's 2007 elections.

It would be a mistake to see the PJD in purely Islamic terms.

The party is equally focused on economic reform, social

services and social justice. Spain would like to see a joint

focus on these topics and does not believe that extreme

liberalization is the way to achieve results. "We are not

talking to the right people. We need to talk to religious

parties who have a social base and have been meeting the

demands of the people".

19.(C) Tunisia is of lower strategic importance to Spain. It

has resisted the EuroMed political dialog. "We want to see

elections, not 99% victories". The GOS pointed to Tunisia's

dependence on Europe for 95% of its exports and implied that

the GOT was quite vulnerable, should Europe ever decide to

impose some form of political conditionality on access to the

EU market.

20.(U) This cable has been cleared by @ELIMINADO@.

MANZANARES;"

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